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INTRODUCTION 
What is a war crime? The question appears to have a simple answer: a war 
crime is a violation of the law of war. But do all violations of the law of war 
qualify as war crimes? And are all war crimes violations of the law of war? These 
questions are not new. In 1942, Hersch Lauterpacht, a leading international 
lawyer who assisted the prosecution of the Nazis for war crimes at the 
International Military Tribunal (IMT) in Nuremberg, wrote a memo in which he 
asked, “Is there a definition of war crimes?”1 More than seven decades later, the 
answer to his question remains unsettled. 
To date, the most common approach to defining a war crime has been to 
identify a war crime as a violation of the law of war that has been 
“criminalized.”2 This approach has the appeal of simplicity, but it lacks a deep 
underlying justification and thus fails to guide criminal tribunals, courts, or 
commissions seeking to determine what a war crime is. It leads to varied answers 
to the question, “What is a war crime?”, since each statute that criminalizes 
violations of the law of war does so slightly differently. It also leads to confusion 
over whether an act must have been historically punishable as a crime in order 
to constitute a prosecutable “war crime” today—and therefore whether 
international criminal law can evolve over time. 
As international criminal liability continues to spread, this “it’s a war crime 
if it’s been criminalized” approach is likely to yield a plethora of disconnected 
criminal statutes with little underlying rhyme or reason guiding them. When 
existing international tribunals, including most notably the International 
Criminal Court (ICC), add new war crimes to their statutes or prosecute for the 
first time those already included in their statutes, the apparent need to prove that 
the offenses have been “criminalized” may produce inconsistent results and 
uncertainty about the corpus of war crimes. When domestic courts and 
prosecutors are called to assess whether a particular act mentioned in a domestic 
statute amounts to an international “war crime,” the current approach fails to 
provide clear guidance on where to look for confirmation. 
This uncertainty is not merely a problem for academic treatises; it has real 
world consequences. For instance, the U.S. military commissions at Guantánamo 
Bay, Cuba, have jurisdiction over violations of the law of war but not over mere 
domestic crimes.3 In the case against Omar Khadr, the prosecution has 
maintained that Khadr, who threw a grenade during a firefight in Afghanistan in 
 
 1. Memorandum by Hersch Lauterpacht to the Committee on Crimes Against International 
Public Order entitled “Punishment of War Crimes” 6 (1942), http://diginole.lib.fsu.edu/islandora/
object/fsu%3A547450. 
 2. See infra Part II. See generally GERHARD WERLE & FLORIAN JESSBERGER, PRINCIPLES OF 
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 390, 392 (3d ed. 2014); Alexander Schwarz, War Crimes, MAX PLANCK 
ENCYCLOPEDIA PUB. INT’L L., ¶¶ 1, 22 (2014), http://opil.ouplaw.com/view/10.1093/law:epil
/9780199231690/law-9780199231690-e431. 
 3. The jurisdiction of the military commissions under the 2009 Military Commissions Act 
extends to prosecutions “for any offense made punishable by [the Act itself]” as well as offenses under 
the “law of war.” Military Commissions Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-84, § 948(d), 123 Stat. 2190, 2576 
(2009). 
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2002,4 committed a war crime when he killed an enemy combatant—even 
though his act did not violate international humanitarian law (IHL)—because he 
was an “unlawful enemy combatant.”5 But is that enough to constitute a war 
crime?6 If not, then the commission lacks jurisdiction. Similarly, the Special 
Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL) confronted the question of whether the 
recruitment of child soldiers amounted to a “war crime” triable before it.7 Once 
again, the judges struggled to define a war crime and became mired in the 
confusing and conflicting case law. 
Even outside the prosecution context, the “criminalization” approach to a 
war crimes definition creates problems. Consider the U.S. Alien Tort Statute 
(ATS): the ATS permits aliens to sue in tort for violations of “the law of 
nations.”8 Courts have long recognized a “war crime” as a violation of the law 
of nations,9 but which acts qualify? U.S. courts have been inconsistent in how 
they have answered this question because they have been unable to agree on what 
exactly constitutes a war crime.10 
This Article aims to distill the core features of war crimes in a way that 
transcends these differences to supply practitioners, jurists, and scholars with a 
consistent and intuitive definition that can be applied in different jurisdictional 
contexts. It aims to identify substantive criteria for war crimes that permit 
evolution and innovation without retroactively subjecting any individual to 
criminal penalty. Specifically, to be an international war crime, an act must meet 
two substantive criteria: it must be (1) a breach of IHL (2) that is serious. In other 
words, to be a war crime, an act must violate IHL, but not all violations of IHL 
are subject to criminal penalty—only those that are “serious.” 
We argue that the concerns about retroactivity and lack of notice that 
motivate the “criminalization” approach should be addressed not by 
incorporating retroactivity into the definition but by establishing non-
retroactivity as an independent check on the prosecution—a check that is specific 
to the context in which a particular prosecution takes place. This approach 
achieves the goal of ensuring that criminal penalties are not illegitimately applied 
 
 4. Brief of Appellant, United States v. Khadr, No. 07-001 (Ct. of M. Comm’n R. Nov. 8, 2013), 
https://www.justsecurity.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/11/khadr.cmcr_.brief_.pdf; Dean Bennet, 
Hearing Seeking to Ease Omar Khadr’s Bail Conditions Cancelled, THE STAR (Aug. 31, 2017), 
https://www.thestar.com/news/canada/2017/08/31/hearing-seeking-to-ease-omar-khadrs-bail-conditions-
cancelled.html. 
 5. See, e.g., Supplemental Brief in Support of the Government’s Appeal at 13, United States 
v. Khadr, No. 07-001 (Ct. M. Comm’n R. June 4, 2007) (“Congress sought to establish an enduring 
process for prosecuting unlawful enemy combatants for war crimes in this and future conflicts.”). 
 6. Unlawful combatants can include civilians, non-combatant members of armed groups, or 
guerillas, who lose their protected status as civilians by actively engaging in hostilities. See Alexander 
Fraser, For the Sake of Consistency: Distinguishing Combatant Terrorists from Non-Combatant 
Terrorists in Modern Warfare, 51 U. RICH. L. REV. 593, 598-99 (2017). 
 7. Prosecutor v. Hinga Norman, Case No. SCSL-2004-14-AR729E, Appeals Chamber 
Decision on Preliminary Motion Based on Lack of Jurisdiction (Child Recruitment) (Special Ct. for Sierra 
Leone May 31, 2004) [hereinafter Hinga Norman Appeals Chamber Decision]; see discussion infra notes 
139-143. 
 8. Alien Tort Statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2018). 
 9. See Kadić v. Karadžić, 70 F.3d 232, 236 (2d Cir. 1995) (holding that individuals may be 
held liable under the ATS for genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity). 
 10. See infra Section IV.A.2. 
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to activity that was not criminal at the time of its commission, while avoiding 
much of the confusion, circularity, and uncertainty that currently plagues efforts 
to define war crimes. 
This Article proceeds in four Parts. Part I begins by following the history 
of war crimes from the late 1800s to the present in order to show the roots of the 
contemporary understanding of war crimes. Part II presents the prevailing 
interpretation of war crimes in contemporary academic literature and as 
articulated by international tribunals: law of war offenses that have been 
“criminalized.” This Part then offers a critique of “criminalization” as a method 
of identifying the proper reach of “war crimes.” Part III offers an alternative 
definition of war crimes that does not rely on criminalization and instead treats 
non-retroactivity as an independent, prosecution-specific check. Part IV then 
identifies the theoretical and practical benefits of recognizing a trans-
jurisdictional definition of war crimes. The new definition not only yields more 
predictable and consistent international law, but it also has the potential to 
resolve some contentious contemporary debates in U.S. courts, including those 
over the proper jurisdiction of the military commissions at Guantánamo Bay and 
the scope of potential liability under the ATS.11 
I. THE HISTORY OF “WAR CRIMES” 
To understand why the task of defining a war crime continues to challenge 
scholars and practitioners, this Part traces the historical origins of “war crimes.” 
Although rules regulating the conduct of war have ancient roots and international 
treaties regulating the conduct of war were first concluded in the mid-1800s, the 
modern concept of war crimes and modern war crimes prosecutions did not 
emerge until the Nuremberg trials in the wake of World War II. Notably, the 
judgment by the IMT erred by failing to adequately address a key objection: that 
criminal punishment of the Nazis was retroactive and thus did not respect the 
basic principle of legality. The failure of the tribunal to address this concern 
provoked intense criticism that contributed to a decades-long halt in international 
war crimes prosecution. When international criminal tribunals and the ICC 
finally emerged at the close of the twentieth century, they responded to concerns 
about the retroactivity of international criminal liability by incorporating 
“criminalization” into the very definition of a “war crime”—an approach that 
remains dominant, but which has produced significant confusion. 
A.  Early Laws of War 
Rules regulating the conduct of war are hardly new.12 The Hebrew Bible, 
 
 11. See, e.g., Al Bahlul v. United States, 840 F.3d 757, 804 (D.C. Cir. 2016); Khulumani v. 
Barclay Nat’l Bank, 504 F.3d 254, 259 (2d Cir. 2007) (per curiam) (rejecting the trial court’s holding “that 
aiding and abetting violations of customary international law cannot provide a basis for ATCA 
jurisdiction”); see also Marty Lederman & Steve Vladeck, al Bahlul and the Future of Domestic Law-of-
War Offenses in Military Commissions, JUST SECURITY (July 16, 2014), https://www.justsecurity.org
/12948/al-bahlul-2/. 
 12. International legal scholar Daniel Thürer writes, “Wars have always been fought in 
accordance with certain norms. It is one of the astonishing facts of history that, to a great extent, wars 
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though it sanctioned immense brutality, condemned unnecessary collateral and 
environmental damage when besieging cities;13 the Mahabharata spoke of 
conduct on the battlefield in terms that prefigure “proportionality”;14 and the 
Quran explained the early law of self-defense.15 Codes of war existed in ancient 
China, Greece, India, Japan, and Rome,16 while thinkers from the Enlightenment 
through the modern era sought to extend the intellectual foundation of wartime 
obligations beyond domestic borders.17 
Although there have long been rules governing the conduct of war, the 
modern concept of “war crime” and the use of international courts to try war 
criminals are largely twentieth-century inventions. Before Nuremberg, the 
regulation of wartime conduct was marked by two intertwined features. First, the 
law of war regulated State conduct, and States were in turn obligated to police 
their militaries for compliance with the law of war. Individuals could be held 
accountable by their own State or by enemy forces for violating the law of war,18 
but there were no international war crimes tribunals. Second, when the term “war 
crime” first emerged in the mid-1800s, its meaning was fundamentally different 
from the meaning it has today. In part because individual legal personality in 
international law was (as it has remained) a contentious subject, “war crimes” 
were defined, not by international law, but instead by its absence: where conduct 
was not privileged by the law of war, it became subject to domestic prosecution. 
In other words, war crimes in this era are best understood as criminal acts not 
immunized by international law, rather than as severe violations of IHL, as is the 
case today. 
1. Focus on State Responsibility 
The common starting point for examining the formal legal regulation of 
war is the Lieber Code, issued by President Abraham Lincoln in 1863 to regulate 
 
were not chaotic affairs—despite outward appearances to the contrary—but governed by rules.” DANIEL 
THÜRER, INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW: THEORY, PRACTICE, CONTEXT 33 (2011); see also 
DAVID M. CROWE, WAR CRIMES, GENOCIDE, AND JUSTICE 1 (2014). 
 13. See, e.g., Deuteronomy 20:19 (“When you lay siege to a city for a long time, fighting against 
it to capture it, do not destroy its trees by putting an ax to them, because you can eat their fruit. Do not cut 
them down. Are the trees people, that you should besiege them?”). 
 14. See, e.g., Mahabharata 12:96 (noting, for example, that “[a] warrior whose armour has fallen 
off, or who begs for quarter, saying, ‘I am thine’ or joining his hands, or who has laid aside his weapon, 
may simply be seized but never slain”). 
 15. See, e.g., Quran 22:39 (Surah Al-Hajj, Verse 39) (“To those against whom war is made, 
permission is given (to fight) for they have been oppressed, and verily Allah is well able to assist them.”). 
 16. See MICHAEL BRYANT, A WORLD HISTORY OF WAR CRIMES 11-71 (2016). 
 17. Hersch Lauterpacht, The Law of Nations and the Punishment of War Crimes, 21 BRIT. Y.B. 
INT’L L. 58, 65 (1944) (“There is a weighty additional reason why the Hague Conventions must be 
considered to be binding upon individuals irrespective of the question whether they have been expressly 
incorporated as part of municipal law. This is so for the reason that they formulate and are largely 
declaratory of the fundamental rules of warfare as dictated by generally recognized principles of 
humanity.”). See generally THEODOR MERON, WAR CRIMES LAW COMES OF AGE (1998). 
 18. Eve La Haye, a legal advisor of the International Committee of the Red Cross, writes that 
“individuals could always be held criminally responsible if they breached the laws of war.” EVE LA HAYE, 
WAR CRIMES IN INTERNAL ARMED CONFLICTS 105 (2009). Yet, the legal obligations flowed through the 
States involved in the conflict, not directly to the individual. 
58 THE YALE JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol. 44: 1 
the conduct of “Armies of the United States in the Field.”19 Though it did not 
refer to “war crimes,” the Lieber Code stipulated that the law of war disclaimed 
“all cruelty and bad faith concerning engagements concluded with the enemy 
during the war,” and that violations “shall be severely punished.”20 The Code 
provided for prosecution of soldiers who violated the law of war.21 Jurisdiction, 
however, was granted to U.S. military commissions, not to an international 
tribunal.22 The Code also established that certain domestic crimes committed 
abroad could be prosecuted in commissions, likely in an effort to ensure that the 
United States could discipline criminal behavior that might otherwise fall outside 
any tribunal’s jurisdiction to punish. As the Code noted, “[c]rimes punishable by 
all penal codes, such as arson, murder, maiming, assaults, highway robbery, 
theft, burglary, fraud, forgery, and rape, if committed by an American soldier in 
a hostile country against its inhabitants, are . . . punishable as at home.”23 
Members of the armed forces could not be held criminally liable for their mere 
“warlike acts”; after all, the purpose of a soldier was precisely to engage in 
“killing, wounding, or other warlike acts” on behalf of the sovereign.24 
Treaties, including the landmark Hague and Geneva Conventions,25 also 
did not establish international war crimes as we think of them today. They 
focused on State, rather than individual, conduct—and left to the State the task 
of regulating its armed forces and civilians to ensure compliance with the law of 
war.26 The Geneva Convention of 1864 bound States to respect a range of rules 
that primarily sought to define the rights of victims and prisoners of war. States, 
in turn, enforced these rules within their military ranks. States were required to 
 
 19. General Orders No. 100: Instructions for the Government of Armies of the United States in 
the Field, art. 11 (Apr. 24, 1863), reprinted in 2 FRANCIS LIEBER, CONTRIBUTIONS TO POLITICAL SCIENCE 
245, 247–74 (1881) [hereinafter Lieber Code]. 
 20. Id. 
 21. Gideon M. Hart, Military Commissions and the Lieber Code: Toward a New Understanding 
of the Jurisdictional Foundations of Military Commissions, 203 MIL. L. REV. 1, 4-5 (2010). Hart discusses 
not only the military commissions under the Lieber Code, but also the war commissions that preceded it, 
in which Union soldiers were tried for criminal acts. Id. at 8-12. These appear to be consistent with prior 
practice, in which States held their own soldiers responsible for perpetrating crimes on each other or 
civilians. See infra notes 22-24 and accompanying text. 
 22. Lieber Code, supra note 19, art. 13 (“The law of war does not only disclaim all cruelty and 
bad faith concerning engagements concluded with the enemy during the war, but also the breaking of 
stipulations solemnly contracted by the belligerents in time of peace, and avowedly intended to remain in 
force in case of war between the contracting powers. . . . It disclaims all extortions and other transactions 
for individual gain; all acts of private revenge, or connivance at such acts. . . . Offenses to the contrary 
shall be severely punished, and especially so if committed by officers.”). 
 23. Id. art. 47. 
 24. Id. art. 57 (“So soon as a man is armed by a sovereign government and takes the soldier’s 
oath of fidelity, he is a belligerent; his killing, wounding, or other warlike acts are not individual crimes 
or offenses. No belligerent has a right to declare that enemies of a certain class, color, or condition, when 
properly organized as soldiers, will not be treated by him as public enemies.”). 
 25. Hague Convention (II) with Respect to the Laws and Customs of War on Land, July 29, 
1899, 32 Stat. 1803; Hague Convention (IV) Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, Oct. 18, 
1907, 36 Stat. 2277 [hereinafter Hague Convention (IV)]; Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the 
Coundition of the Wounded in Armies in the Field, Aug. 22, 1864, 22 Stat. 940 [hereinafter 1864 Red 
Cross Convention] (revised in 1906). It is no longer possible, nor particularly useful, to make a distinction 
between what was once called the “Law of Geneva” and the “Law of the Hague,” as the Additional 
Protocols I & II integrated the two bodies of law. THÜRER, supra note 12, at 46-47. 
 26. LA HAYE, supra note 18. 
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inform their armies of the rules of international law and to answer to enemy 
States when their forces broke these rules.27 However, the Convention lacked 
any mention of war crimes or breaches as punishable international crimes. 
The 1906 Geneva Convention marked the first time that a binding 
multilateral IHL treaty addressed law of war abuses committed by individuals.28 
However, it did so by obligating States to ensure that their penal laws were 
sufficient to “repress, in time of war, individual acts of robbery and ill treatment 
of the sick and wounded of the armies, as well as to punish” certain violations of 
the Convention.29 States were again obligated to regulate the conduct of their 
own forces through domestic legal and military systems. The 1899 and 1907 
Hague Conventions did not change this basic structure. They established 
standards for accepted weaponry and methods of warfare, as used and controlled 
by States. The 1907 Convention, for instance, expanded the scope of State 
responsibility under customary international law, reinforcing “the principle that 
the State, rather than the individual, is responsible under international law for 
breach of the laws and customs of war.”30 But neither established the 
international criminal responsibility of individuals, nor did they create a 
universal right of States to prosecute perpetrators for violations.31 States parties 
remained responsible for “issu[ing] instructions to their armed land forces” to 
abide by the rules set forth in the treaties and ensure their compliance.32 As 
Article 3 of the 1907 Convention provides, breaches of the law of war would be 
enforced through inter-State interactions, not criminal prosecution.33 
The law of war developed in this pre-World War I era thus continued to 
 
 27. 1864 Red Cross Convention, supra note 25, art. 8 (explaining in Article 8 that the 
“execution” of the Convention shall simply “be regulated by the commanders-in-chief of the belligerent 
armies, according to the instructions of their respective Governments, and in accordance with the general 
principles laid down in this convention”). Even the Lieber Code of 1863, which refers in comparatively 
greater detail to punishment for violations of the law of war, can be understood to recognize the State as 
the mechanism through which the law of war was to be enforced. Article 11 explains that “[t]he law of 
war does not only disclaim all cruelty and bad faith concerning engagements concluded with the enemy 
during the war, but also the breaking of stipulations solemnly contracted by the belligerents in time of 
peace, and avowedly intended to remain in force in case of war between the contracting powers.” Lieber 
Code, supra note 19. While the laws of war provided in the Code “do not apply except between 
Contracting Powers, and then only if all the belligerents are parties to the Convention,” “[t]he laws, rights, 
and duties of war apply not only to armies, but also to militia and volunteer corps fulfilling the following 
conditions.” Hague Convention (IV), supra note 25, arts. 1-2. 
 28. Ryan Liss, Crime at the Limits of Sovereignty: Rethinking International Criminal Justice 
153 (Sept. 2018) (unpublished J.S.D. dissertation, Yale University) (on file with authors). 
 29. Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in 
Armies in the Field art. 28, July 6, 1906, 35 Stat. 1885 (revising 1864 Red Cross Convention, supra note 
25) (“In the event of their military penal laws being insufficient, the signatory governments also engage 
to take, or to recommend to their legislatures, the necessary measures to repress, in time of war, individual 
acts of robbery and ill treatment of the sick and wounded of the armies, as well as to punish, as usurpations 
of military insignia, the wrongful use of the flag and brassard of the Red Cross by military persons or 
private individuals not protected by the present convention.”). 
 30. LYAL S. SUNGA, INDIVIDUAL RESPONSIBILITY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW FOR SERIOUS 
HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS 21 (1992). 
 31. LA HAYE, supra note 18, at 106 (2009). 
 32. Hague Convention (IV), supra note 25. 
 33. Id. art. 3 (“A belligerent party which violates the provisions of the said Regulations shall, if 
the case demands, be liable to pay compensation. It shall be responsible for all acts committed by persons 
forming part of its armed forces.”). 
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locate responsibility for the conduct of individuals with the State. The regulation 
of individuals under the law of war was, as one commentator has summarized it, 
effectively a two-part system: “breaches of the laws of war by soldiers were 
punishable at the local level by States exercising normal territorial jurisdiction 
and military discipline,” while at the same time, “responsibility at the 
international level” could still be “owed by the state of the soldier’s nationality 
(or allegiance) to the state injured by the war crime.”34 
Amidst this practice, the “principle that individuals are not subjects of the 
law of nations” unsurprisingly remained firmly entrenched in the minds of many 
scholars throughout the first half of the twentieth century.35 Though he disagreed, 
Hans Kelsen wrote in 1944 that “[m]ost of the writers on international law 
maintain that war crimes constitute only penal offenses against national law, and 
that they have only ‘municipal’ character, since international law does not 
provide punishment of the offenders.”36 American political scientist Quincy 
Wright similarly concluded that this lack of direct individual responsibility 
resulted from the fact that during “the nineteenth century the notion of 
sovereignty became so exalted that many people thought anybody could commit 
any crime and gain immunity if in the pursuance of an act of a sovereign state.”37 
2. “War Crime” 
The idea of a “war crime” was rarely referenced before the mid-twentieth 
century. There appears to have been not a single reference to the term in print 
before the mid-1800s. Once it emerged, its meaning was fundamentally different 
from today’s. Instead of referring to conduct that violated the law regulating the 
conduct of war, it typically referred to conduct during war that was not protected 
by the law of war. Such conduct was therefore open to prosecution by domestic 
tribunals—whether ordinary domestic courts, military commissions, or courts 
martial. 
The term “war crime” appears to have been first used in print in 1872, in 
the second edition of Johann Caspar Bluntschli’s Das moderne Völkerrecht der 
civilisirten Staten als Rechtsbuch dargestellt.38 The term (kriegsverbrechen, in 
German) appeared once in passing, in reference to the obligation of civilians not 
 
 34. GERRY J. SIMPSON, LAW, WAR AND CRIME: WAR CRIMES, TRIALS AND THE REINVENTION 
OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 162 (2007). 
 35. Paola Gaeta, War Crimes and Other International ‘Core’ Crimes, in THE OXFORD 
HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL LAW IN ARMED CONFLICT 737, 738 (2014) (quoting G. Manner, The 
Legal Nature and Punishment of Criminal Acts of Violence Contrary to the Laws of War, 37 AM. J. INT’L 
L. 407 (1943)). 
 36. HANS KELSEN, PEACE THROUGH LAW 101 (5th ed. 2007). 
 37. Quincy Wright, The Nuremberg Trial, 246 ANNALS OF AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 72, 78 
(1946). 
 38. The identification of Bluntschli as the first writer to mention a “war crime” in print is from 
JOHN FABIAN WITT, LINCOLN’S CODE 343, 465 (2012) (citing JOHANN CASPAR BLUNTSCHLI, DAS 
MODERNE VÖLKERRECHT DER CIVILISIRTEN STATEN ALS RECHTSBUCH DARGESTELLT [MODERN 
INTERNATIONAL LAW OF CIVILIZED STATES AS A LEGAL CODE] § 643a (1878)). Witt observes that Lieber 
had used the term earlier but not in print. Witt cites to the 1878 edition, but the term first appeared in the 
1872 edition. In this and other work, Bluntschli drew heavily on the work of Francis Lieber, author of the 
Lieber Code. WITT, supra, at 343. 
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to “promote such war crimes.”39 The reference to “such war crimes” in turn 
appears to relate to the preceding paragraphs, which provide that civilians in an 
occupied territory who take up arms may be court-martialed and punished with 
death.40 Thus, rather than refer to criminal punishment for combatants who 
engage in violations of the rules and regulations of war, the first mention of “war 
crimes” in print was instead to the resort to arms by civilians—conduct that was 
not immunized by the laws of war because it was not carried out by lawful 
combatants. 
More than three decades later, German jurist L. F. L. Oppenheim used the 
term “war crime” in his famous treatise on international law.41 Once again, while 
the term was the same as the term used today, Oppenheim’s description of a war 
crime reflected an understanding of “war crime” that was entirely different. 
Noting that “[w]riters on the Law of Nations have hitherto not systematically 
treated the question of War Crimes and their punishment,” Oppenheim wrote 
that “war crimes are such hostile or other acts of soldiers or other individuals as 
may be punished by the enemy on capture of the offenders.”42 
Oppenheim defined four different kinds of war crime: (1) violations of 
recognized rules of warfare by enemy armed forces, if carried out without orders; 
(2) hostilities committed by individuals not members of the enemy armed forces; 
(3) espionage and war treason; and (4) marauding acts.43 The first category—
violations of the rules regarding warfare by members of armed forces—were, 
Oppenheim explained, “war crimes only when committed without an order of 
the belligerent Government concerned.”44 If the acts were committed under 
orders, States could resort to reprisals against the offending States, but the 
individuals could not be prosecuted for war crimes. The second category—
hostilities committed by individuals not members of enemy armed forces—were 
punishable because the individuals did not enjoy the privileged treatment of 
members of armed forces. This category appears to echo Bluntschli’s earlier 
reference. Such acts were “war crimes, not because they really are violations of 
recognized rules regarding warfare, but because the enemy has the right to 
consider and punish them as acts of illegitimate warfare.”45 Similarly, espionage, 
war treason, and marauding could be prosecuted because those committing the 
acts were not protected by immunities granted to armed forces in war—in the 
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case of espionage and war treason, because they are committed by armed forces 
not in uniform,46 and in the case of marauding, because it was often committed 
by “soldiers who have left their corps.”47 
In short, early efforts by both Bluntschli and Oppenheim to define war 
crimes specified a category of criminal acts that took place in war but were not 
sanctioned by—and thus not protected or immunized by—the law of war. 
B. World War II and the Creation of the Modern “War Crime” 
The shift in the understanding of “war crime” can be traced to changes that 
took place in the period between World War I and World War II. Following 
World War I, the Allies attempted to subject Kaiser Wilhelm II to criminal 
liability for waging war. The Versailles Treaty stated: “The German Government 
recognises the right of the allied and associated powers to bring before military 
tribunals persons accused of having committed acts in violation of the laws and 
customs of war. Such persons shall, if found guilty, be sentenced to punishments 
laid down by law.”48 
However, the charge was not for a legal violation but instead an offense 
against “international morality” and the “sanctity of treaties.”49 The impropriety 
of criminal prosecution for what was not, in fact, a criminal act. The absence of 
any legal prohibition on aggressive war led the government of the Netherlands—
to which the Kaiser had fled—to refuse to release him to the Allies. The 
Americans agreed, concluding that “a precedent is lacking, and . . . appears to be 
unknown in the practice of nations.”50 
At the conclusion of World War II, however, the situation had changed 
markedly. In 1943, the Allies founded the United Nations War Crimes 
Commission to investigate war crimes committed by Nazi Germany, and the 
foreign ministers of the Allies announced in Moscow that the perpetrators of 
wartime atrocities would be tried.51 In 1945, Manfred Lachs, a Polish diplomat 
and future president of the International Court of Justice, reflected on these 
developments and the need to break away from a State-centric view of the law 
of war. He explained, while “[w]ar crimes may appear a minor issue in this 
deadly conflict,” “the manner in which the problem is resolved might become a 
great precedent.”52 He wished to see the concept of war crimes elevated “to the 
 
 46. Id. at 159-63. 
 47. Id. at 270. 
 48. Treaty of Peace Between the Allied and Associated Powers and Germany art. 228, June 28, 
1919, 2 Bevans 43. The argument in this Section draws significantly from OONA HATHAWAY & SCOTT 
SHAPIRO, THE INTERNATIONALISTS 244-75 (2017). 
 49. HATHAWAY & SHAPIRO, supra note 48, at 252. 
 50. Treaty of Peace with Germany: Hearings Before the S. Comm. on Foreign Relations, 66th 
Cong. 372 (1919); see also Liss, supra note 28, at 37 n.181 Though a few war crimes prosecutions of 
other German officials did occur, they were generally regarded as a failure. The Treatment of War Crimes 
and Crimes Incidental to the War, 22 BULL. OF INT’L NEWS 95-102 (1945); see also David C. Morrison, 
War Crimes, GREAT DECISIONS 68 (2007). 
 51. U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES: THE CONFERENCES AT 
MALTA AND YALTA, 1945 at 407-409 (1955), http://digital.library.wisc.edu/1711.dl/FRUS.FRUS1945. 
 52. MANFRED LACHS, WAR CRIMES: AN ATTEMPT TO DEFINE THE ISSUES 102 (1945). 
2019] What is a War Crime? 63 
height it deserves,” as “[t]he principle that crime does not pay must become law, 
not only in the everyday life of an individual, but also in inter-State relations.”53 
The crucial difference between 1919 and 1945 was that, in the interim, war 
had been outlawed by the States that had participated in World War I, including 
both Germany and Japan. The 1928 Kellogg-Briand Pact provided a foundation 
for charges of illegal conduct that did not exist in the wake of World War I. The 
Pact did not, however, necessarily establish individual criminal liability. Hans 
Kelsen noticed this problem during preparations for the prosecution of the 
German leaders at Nuremberg and offered a powerful argument for holding 
individuals liable, as well as a solution to a looming jurisdictional problem. War 
crimes, he argued, had a “double character”: “they are penal offenses against 
international and at the same time against national law.”54 Kelsen argued that 
States should, as a result, be allowed to prosecute enemy belligerents as well as 
members of their own forces for war crimes. To ensure that the IMT would have 
jurisdiction over such crimes, Kelsen drafted language on individual 
responsibility to be inserted into the agreement forming the tribunal: any person 
who violates “international law forbidding the use of force . . . may be held 
individually responsible for these acts . . . and brought to trial and punishment 
before the court.”55 While international law “always” “leaves to national law to 
specify the penalty,” he explained, the “application of national law to the war 
criminal is at the same time execution of international law.”56 Where no such 
domestic law giving force to international law exists, “a direct application of the 
international rules of warfare by the courts of the State is possible.”57 
Drawing on Kelsen’s arguments as well as arguments developed by 
Lauterpacht, lead British prosecutor at Nuremberg Sir Hartley Shawcross argued 
that individuals could be held responsible for waging war illegally. To the claim 
that the tribunal was attempting to retroactively criminalize behavior, thus 
violating the principle of legality, he responded that the acts were crimes when 
committed even if the machinery of the tribunal did not yet exist to prosecute 
those crimes: 
There is all the difference between saying to a man, “You will now be punished for 
what was not a crime at all at the time you committed it,” and in saying to him, “You 
will now pay the penalty for conduct which was contrary to law and a crime when 
you executed it, although, owing to the imperfection of the international machinery, 
there was at that time no court competent to pronounce judgment against you.”58 
The IMT commenced proceedings in Nuremberg in November 1945, 
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marking the first time in history that an international tribunal heard cases of war 
crimes, crimes against the peace, and crimes against humanity.59 War crimes 
were defined in the tribunal’s Charter as “violations of the laws or customs of 
war,” including, “but not . . . limited to” 
murder, ill-treatment or deportation to slave labor or for any other purpose of civilian 
population of or in occupied territory, murder or ill-treatment of prisoners of war or 
persons on the seas, killing of hostages, plunder of public or private property, wanton 
destruction of cities, towns or villages, or devastation not justified by military 
necessity.60 
In its judgment, the tribunal addressed the question of individual 
responsibility in conclusory—and, it is widely agreed, unsatisfactory—terms, 
even though it had carefully crafted arguments available to it.61 It stated that 
“[c]rimes against international law are committed by men, not by abstract 
entities, and only by punishing individuals who commit such crimes can the 
provisions of international law be enforced.”62 To ground this finding, the 
tribunal simply explained: “[E]nough has been said to show that individuals can 
be punished for violations of International Law.”63 In an attempt to justify this 
approach to what was a skeptical international legal audience, the tribunal 
pointed to the United States’ prosecution of eight German saboteurs in Ex Parte 
Quirin for violating the law of war by landing in the United States for purposes 
of spying and sabotage.64 But many regarded this justification as insufficient—
for U.S. court practice was not international practice. 
The cursory treatment of concerns about retroactivity opened the door to 
accusations that the tribunal had ignored the dictates of justice.65 While 
Nuremberg was a signal moment in the evolution of international criminal law, 
establishing that individuals could be held criminally liable for illegally waged 
war, the failure of the tribunal to fully and adequately justify that liability had a 
corrosive effect on the international criminal law that followed. The resultant 
criticism of the judgment at Nuremberg may have played a role in the decades-
long stasis in international criminal law prosecutions that followed the trials. It 
was not really until the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former 
Yugoslavia (ICTY) was launched in 1993 that the world again attempted 
international prosecutions for war crimes. Moreover, the tribunals that addressed 
war crimes post-Nuremberg took pains to explain that the crimes they prosecuted 
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had been previously criminalized, thus insulating themselves from the chief 
critique launched at the IMT. But that very same emphasis on criminalization—
which courts treated as so essential that they attached it to the very definition of 
a “war crime”—sowed the seeds of confusion about war crimes that continues 
today. 
C. The Geneva Conventions of 1949 
The drafting of the 1949 Geneva Conventions offered an opportunity to 
clarify the scope of war crimes. But continued discomfort with the concept of 
war crimes, perhaps partially inspired by fresh memories of the Nuremberg trials, 
infected the debate. Supporters of the State-centric approach to criminal 
responsibility opposed efforts at the drafting stage of the 1949 Geneva 
Conventions to declare violations as “war crimes” that could entail international 
criminal responsibility. They insisted “that the use of the word ‘crime’ had to be 
avoided, since violations of the Conventions will not be crimes until they are so 
made by domestic penal legislation.”66 This approach aimed to avoid the 
problem of retroactivity by placing the responsibility for prosecution of 
violations of the Convention squarely on domestic courts. 
The 1949 Geneva Conventions consequently did not use the term 
international “war crimes” and simply obligated State parties to “enact any 
legislation necessary to provide effective penal sanctions for persons 
committing, or ordering to be committed, any of the grave breaches of the present 
Convention.”67 Yet by linking the concept of “grave breaches” in the treaty to 
punishment and penalization at the individual level, the drafters of the Geneva 
Conventions created a system that, as commentators have noted, “expressly 
indicate[d] the violations of the rule that, in addition to the international 
responsibility of the party to the conflict, also entail criminal responsibility of 
the individual for war crimes.”68 
Nevertheless, the grave breaches system remained unclear on an important 
point: whether “grave breaches” were to be understood as the same thing as “war 
crimes,” given the lack of any mention of “war crimes” in the Conventions.69 
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Only in 1977, with the entry into force of Additional Protocol I to the Geneva 
Conventions (AP I), was there explicit clarification under Article 85(5) that 
“grave breaches” of the Geneva Conventions and of AP I “shall be regarded as 
war crimes.”70 This removed any doubt about the legality of war crimes 
prosecutions for the most serious offenses under the Geneva Conventions. But 
for breaches of the Geneva Conventions or customary rules, for which there was 
no explicit statement that a breach could give rise to criminal liability, courts 
continued to look to past criminal prosecutions, existing statutes, and military 
codes to determine whether criminal liability was appropriate. As a result, the 
problem of determining the propriety and appropriate scope of individual 
criminal responsibility remained unsettled. 
D. The New War Crimes Tribunals and “War Crimes” Prosecutions 
The close of the twentieth century saw renewed international resolve to 
develop criminal responsibility for violations of the law of war. In 1993 and 
1994, the U.N. Security Council created the ICTY71 and the International 
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR).72 The tribunals were followed by the 
adoption of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (Rome Statute) 
in 1998.73 This was accompanied by ambitious aspirations as much of the 
international community embraced the idea of a permanent judicial body capable 
of bringing perpetrators of atrocities to justice.74 
The Rome Statute envisioned a crystallized, universal, and precise 
rendering of war crimes, integrated into the criminal law of national legal 
systems. But it encountered a number of challenges. There was substantial 
disagreement about the offenses over which the ICC would have jurisdiction, 
and extensive negotiations were required to finalize the Elements of Crimes.75 
The parties inserted an enumerated list of four prosecutable crimes, one of which 
was “war crimes,” to address concerns that the original draft was “too vague or 
ill-defined.”76 For “war crimes,” the Rome Statute vested the ICC with 
jurisdiction in cases of international armed conflict (IAC), where there were 
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“grave breaches” of the 1949 Geneva Conventions, or “[o]ther serious violations 
of the laws and customs applicable in international armed conflict.”77 And in 
situations of non-international armed conflict (NIAC), it granted the court 
jurisdiction over serious violations of Common Article 3 to the Geneva 
Conventions as well as over “[o]ther serious violations of the laws and customs 
applicable in armed conflicts not of an international character.”78 
While the Rome Statute made clear that far more than just “grave breaches” 
could constitute prosecutable war crimes, difficulty arose in determining just 
which of these violations of the law of war not amounting to “grave breaches” 
should properly constitute “war crimes” as a matter of general international law. 
Furthermore, the Rome Statute did nothing to resolve uncertainty regarding 
terminology used by various other sources—for example, the differences 
between the terms “serious violations” in the International Law Commission 
(ILC) Revised Draft Statute,79 “exceptionally serious war crimes” in the ILC 
Code of Crimes,80 and “grave breaches” in the Geneva Conventions. In response 
to these uncertainties, the law of war offered few answers. Law of war rules 
regulate conduct but they do not make clear when and whether a breach can give 
rise to criminal sanction.81 As a result, the term “war crime” in the Rome Statute 
was left “in a state of general terminological confusion.”82 
In addition to the confusion over terminology, the ICC confronted concerns 
regarding legality and fair-warning—the resolution of which depended in part 
on proving that those on trial were being prosecuted for widely-accepted crimes. 
It was not alone in this predicament. The ad hoc tribunals for the former 
Yugoslavia and Rwanda similarly faced the challenge of establishing their 
legitimacy in prosecuting particular war crimes.83 
In response to these challenges, and recognizing similar critiques lodged 
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against the IMT, the ICC and the other modern international criminal tribunals 
argued that the crimes prosecuted before them were not unusual or 
unprecedented in general international law. They pointed to customary 
international law and domestic criminal statutes, as well as prior international 
and domestic criminal prosecutions, as evidence that international criminal 
responsibility for particular IHL breaches was appropriate.84 As a consequence, 
prior “criminalization” came to permeate discussions of international war 
crimes. 
Yet there was considerable confusion about the proper sources of 
individual criminal responsibility.85 Is it possible to infer a source of 
criminalization for non-grave breaches from the statutes of the international 
courts and tribunals themselves? And is it enough to simply point to a crime, 
particularly a non-grave breach, as listed in the Rome Statute or the statutes of 
the ICTY or ICTR? Or is it sufficient (or perhaps even necessary) to look to 
domestic statutes and prosecutions? 
Given this uncertainty, it is hardly surprising that several prominent 
treatises continue to make mention of the “confusing state of war crimes,”86 
noting that the term is “used in various and sometimes contradictory ways.”87 
Some accounts describe both “broad” and “narrow” senses of the term “war 
crimes,” with the former referring to any criminal conduct in war, and the latter 
referring to a more legally-precise definition,88 which often includes 
criminalization.89 Others suggest that a war crime is any violation of IHL.90 
Within some domestic legal systems, the term “war crime” is used to refer to acts 
that would not constitute war crimes under international law.91 
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Some scholars have insisted on Manfred Lachs’s 1945 definition as a 
starting point in defining war crimes,92 adhering to an essentially mid-century or 
classical understanding of war crime.93 Others have written accounts of war 
crimes trials without addressing the terminological haze at all.94 Confusingly, the 
term is also prone to linguistic and idiomatic ambiguity, as it is sometimes used 
colloquially to convey a level of gravity in an offense or to indicate that an 
atrocity may have been committed with a State’s imprimatur. A subgenre of legal 
literature is even devoted to the task of deciphering the appropriate subject of 
“war crimes.”95 
It is in this state of uncertainty that we have entered the twenty-first 
century. The focus on criminalization has contributed to the confusion by by 
amplifying and elevating past practice without specifying the proper sources for 
identifying what constitutes relevant past practice. The next Part explores these 
drawbacks in greater detail. 
II. “CRIMINALIZATION” IN CONTEMPORARY APPROACHES TO WAR CRIMES 
In attempting to determine individual criminal responsibility for IHL 
offenses, contemporary courts and commentators have most frequently 
maintained that war crimes are IHL offenses that have been “criminalized”—
that is, those IHL offenses for which courts, tribunals, or even legislatures 
crafting jurisdictional statutes have previously held individuals criminally 
responsible. This Part explains that the “criminalization” approach developed as 
a solution to theoretical and institutional challenges faced in war crimes 
adjudication after Nuremberg has created unnecessary confusion and uncertainty 
about what constitutes a “war crime.” 
A. “Criminalization” in Contemporary Scholarship and Jurisprudence 
Major IHL treatises, Rome Statute commentaries, scholars, and 
international judges describe war crimes as those breaches of IHL that have been 
“criminalized,” and therefore to which “international criminal responsibility” or 
“individual criminal responsibility” attaches. But what does it mean for an 
offense to have been criminalized? At times, courts and commentators have 
looked to whether a treaty explicitly provides for the criminality of an offense; 
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with a war under specially favourable conditions, created by the war and facilitating its commission, the 
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 94. See, e.g., MICHAEL BRYANT, A WORLD HISTORY OF WAR CRIMES: FROM ANTIQUITY TO 
THE PRESENT (2016); CROWE, supra note 12. Bryant’s history of war crimes does not dwell on precise 
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constitutes a war crime. 
 95. See, e.g., LEENA GROVER, INTERPRETING CRIMES IN THE ROME STATUTE OF THE 
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT (2014). 
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however, only the Geneva Conventions clearly provide for the criminality of law 
of war offenses, and even then only with respect to grave breaches. At other 
times, courts have referenced general principles of international law, albeit only 
in vague terms. So for the most part, courts and commentators have taken an 
easier approach: they look for evidence of previous prosecutions of particular 
IHL offenses as well as evidence of existing domestic and international statutes 
that criminalize or provide jurisdiction over particular offenses. These appeals to 
criminalization, however, lead to varying understandings of what constitutes a 
war crime, since each statute that criminalizes violations of the law of war does 
so slightly differently. These appeals also lead to confusion over whether an act 
must have been historically punishable in order to constitute a prosecutable “war 
crime” today. 
Reliance on “criminalization” as a defining characteristic of a war crime is 
widespread. According to the Commentary to the Rome Statute edited by Kai 
Ambos and Otto Triffterer, a preeminent treatise on international criminal law, 
war crimes are: 
(1) “violations of international humanitarian law that are” 
(2) “criminalized under international law.”96 
Professor Georges Abi-Saab, a former appellate judge at the ICTY, 
similarly describes a war crime as “a violation of a rule of jus in bello” that has 
“the special legal effect of entailing the criminal responsibility of the individual 
who commits it.”97 The major treatise by Gerhard Werle and Florian Jessberger 
agrees. While acknowledging that “the term ‘war crimes’ is used in various and 
sometimes contradictory ways,” Werle and Jessberger state that the more 
“legally precise definition” is that “a war crime is a violation of a rule of 
international humanitarian law that creates direct criminal responsibility under 
international law.”98 Similarly, the Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public 
International Law, which provides respected commentaries on the subject, states 
that “[a] war crime is any act, or omission, committed in an armed conflict that 
constitutes a serious violation of the laws and customs of international 
humanitarian law and has been criminalized by international treaty or customary 
law.”99 In its seminal study of customary IHL, the International Committee for 
the Red Cross (ICRC), one of the most important authorities on the law of war, 
states that war crimes are “serious violations of international humanitarian 
law.”100 But the ICRC clarifies that State practice confirms that war crimes are 
limited to those “[v]iolations entailing individual criminal responsibility under 
 
 96. Cottier, supra note 89 (formatting added for emphasis). Later, with respect to the Rome 
Statute in particular, the Commentary similarly remarks that, “The delegations at Rome agreed on two 
cumulative criteria to define war crimes in Article 8: 1) the conduct must amount to a violation of 
customary international humanitarian law, and 2) the violation of humanitarian law concerned must be 
criminalized under customary international law.” Id. at 309. 
 97. Abi-Saab, supra note 69, at 112 (emphasis added). 
 98. WERLE & JESSBERGER, supra note 2, at 392. 
 99. Schwarz, supra note 2, ¶ 1 (emphasis added). 
 100. JEAN-MARIE HENCKAERTS & LOUISE DOSWALD-BECK, INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF 
THE RED CROSS, 1 CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW: RULES 568-69 (2005). 
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international law.”101 
Perhaps the biggest champions of the “criminalization” approach to 
defining war crimes have been the judges of major international criminal 
tribunals. The ICTY’s first case—the case against Duško Tadić—was the first to 
explicitly announce a view of war crimes rooted in “criminalization.” 102 The 
case has since become the leading case on war crimes. In a seminal interlocutory 
judgment, the Appeals Chamber in Prosecutor v. Tadić enumerated the elements 
of a prosecutable IHL offense in assessing whether it had jurisdiction under 
Article 3 of its Statute, which empowered it to prosecute “persons violating the 
laws or customs of law.”103 According to the Appeals Chamber, in order for an 
offense to be subject to prosecution under Article 3, the following requirements 
had to have been met: 
(i) the violation must constitute an infringement of a rule of international 
humanitarian law; 
(ii) the rule must be customary in nature or, if it belongs to treaty law, the required 
conditions must be met . . . ; 
(iii) the violation must be “serious”, that is to say, it must constitute a breach of a 
rule protecting important values, and the breach must involve grave consequences 
for the victim . . . [; and] 
(iv) the violation of the rule must entail, under customary or conventional law, the 
individual criminal responsibility of the person breaching the rule.104 
The fourth of these elements has sparked the most debate. This element 
speaks to the core challenge of determining how to apply IHL rules to individuals 
in an international criminal law context. But what does an assessment of 
“individual criminal responsibility” under this fourth element entail? In applying 
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COURT: A COMMENTARY 381 (Antonio Cassese et al. eds., 2002). 
72 THE YALE JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol. 44: 1 
this element, the Tadić Appeals Chamber avoided complex theoretical inquiry 
into the nature of individual responsibility and instead looked to past 
prosecutions and existing criminal and jurisdictional statutes. 
The Tadić Appeals Chamber first began with an intuitive approach: 
assessing the IHL rule that had allegedly been breached for guidance as to 
whether it contemplated penal consequences and whether the breach had been 
prosecuted as a war crime in the past. Had the case before the Tadić Appeals 
Chamber concerned an alleged grave breach of the Geneva Conventions, as 
opposed to an alleged violation of Common Article 3, the inquiry would have 
ended there.105 But the Chamber reasoned that even non-grave breaches, such as 
violations of Common Article 3, could be “war crimes” provided they had been 
criminalized.106 This was despite the absence of explicit contemplation of 
individual criminal responsibility for such offenses in the Geneva Conventions 
of 1949, in the Additional Protocols, or in any other source of IHL rules. 
Referencing the IMT, the Tadić Appeals Chamber explained that “a finding of 
individual criminal responsibility is not barred by the absence of treaty 
provisions on punishment of breaches.”107 
To make the case for considering non-grave breaches of IHL “war crimes,” 
the Tadić Appeals Chamber recalled the approach taken at Nuremberg, where 
there was no IHL treaty explicitly contemplating international criminal 
responsibility for any IHL offenses, let alone any relevant history of past 
prosecutions. According to the Chamber, the IMT resolved these problems by 
“consider[ing] a number of factors relevant to its conclusion that the authors of 
particular prohibitions incur individual responsibility.”108 These factors included 
the following: “the clear and unequivocal recognition of the rules of warfare in 
international law and State practice indicating an intention to criminalize the 
prohibition, including statements by government officials and international 
organizations, as well as punishment of violations by national courts and military 
tribunals.”109 
Drawing on Nuremberg, the Tadić Appeals Chamber then surveyed a 
variety of sources, including the Military Manual of Germany, the “Interim Law 
of Armed Conflict Manual” of New Zealand, the U.S. Department of the Army 
Field Manual, and the British Manual of 1958.110 All of these documents, it 
explained, pointed to a conclusion that breaches of Common Article 3 are 
criminally punishable.111 
The ICTY repeated this approach in Prosecutor v. Galić. As in Tadić, the 
Galić Trial and Appeals Chambers adopted an approach to “criminal 
responsibility” that involved looking to past prosecutions as well as domestic 
statutes incorporating given IHL offenses. The Galić Trial Chamber was 
 
 105. See supra notes 67-70 and accompanying text. 
 106. Tadić Interlocutory Appeals Decision, supra note 102, ¶ 131. 
 107. Id. ¶ 128. 
 108. Id. 
 109. Id. 
 110. Id. ¶ 131. 
 111. Id. 
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specifically tasked with considering whether terrorism could be a war crime. To 
determine this, it followed the approach in Tadić to the letter, including the fourth 
element, which required it to determine “whether the intent to spread terror had 
already been criminalized by 1992.”112 The Galić Trial Chamber began by noting 
that the first conviction of terrorism against a civilian population was delivered 
in Makassar in the Dutch East Indies in 1947; it then turned to the history of how 
the crime of terrorism came to be included in the Nuremberg Charter.113 It then 
noted Australia’s war crimes statute of 1945, which established terrorism as a 
crime.114 As in Tadić, the Galić Trial Chamber concluded that this evidence was 
sufficient to allow the tribunal to hold an individual criminally responsible for 
an act of terrorism.115 On appeal, the Appeals Chamber in Galić reaffirmed that 
the appropriate approach to determining individual criminal responsibility was 
to look to past prosecutions, established criminal statutes, and military codes. 
The Galić Appeals Chamber looked to the 1919 Report of the Commission on 
Responsibilities which deemed terrorism a war crime, as well as to the 
Norwegian Military Penal Code of 1902, the criminal codes of the Czech 
Republic and the Slovak Republic, the Penal Code of Côte d’Ivoire, and a host 
of other domestic criminal and penal codes, all of which considered terrorism a 
prosecutable crime.116 
The ICC has taken a similar approach. The Rome Statute grants the ICC 
war crimes jurisdiction over “grave breaches” of the Geneva Conventions of 
1949, serious violations of Common Article 3 to the Geneva Conventions, and 
“[o]ther serious violations of the laws and customs applicable in international 
armed conflict” and NIAC.117 However, when it comes to the non-grave 
breaches, confusion remains over how to determine which violations of IHL 
constitute war crimes and whether the Rome Statute itself criminalizes all 
offenses falling within its jurisdiction. As locating the source of criminalization 
for the non-grave breaches offenses in the Rome Statute itself runs into issues of 
circularity, some scholars maintain that an offense must have been criminalized 
by statute or custom before it can constitute a war crime in terms of Article 8.118 
But when ICC chambers have been called upon to confirm war crime charges, 
they have simply referenced the Rome Statute as the primary source of 
criminalization. 
For example, in confirming charges against Congolese warlord Thomas 
Lubanga for the conscription, enlistment, and use of child soldiers in the Ituri 
conflict, the ICC Pre-Trial Chamber pointed to the Rome Statute as the source 
of criminalization to address the defense’s contention that he could not have been 
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aware that recruitment and use of child soldiers constituted a crime: 
Having regard to the principle of legality, the terms enlisting, conscripting and using 
children under the age of fifteen years to participate actively in hostilities are defined 
with sufficient particularity in articles 8(2)(b)(xxvi) and 8(2)(e)(vii), 22 to 24 and 77 
of the Rome Statute and the Elements of Crimes, which entered into force on 1 July 
2002, as entailing criminal responsibility and punishable as criminal offences.119 
Thus, the ICC Pre-Trial Chamber rejected Defendant Lubanga’s 
submission that he could not have “foreseeably . . . anticipated . . . his individual 
criminal responsibility.”120 It ruled that Lubanga should have known the 
enlistment and use of child soldiers constituted a “war crime” because of the 
Rome Statute’s inclusion of these offenses.121 As the tribunal explained: 
[T]here is no infringement of the principle of legality if the Chamber exercises its 
power to decide whether Thomas Lubanga Dyilo ought to be committed for trial on 
the basis of written (lex scripta) pre-existing criminal norms approved by the States 
Parties to the Rome Statute (lex praevia), defining prohibited conduct and setting out 
the related sentence (lex certa), which cannot be interpreted by analogy in malam 
partem (lex stricta).122 
Moreover, the Chamber established the criminal nature of such offenses by 
adopting the position of victims’ representatives that “[t]he Statute’s entry into 
force could not have escaped the attention of Thomas Lubanga, who claims to 
be a politician and head of state, and who, because of his involvement in an 
armed conflict, was directly concerned.”123 
Taken together, these examples represent the prevailing contemporary 
approach to war crimes: war crimes are IHL breaches that have previously been 
criminalized by courts or under existing statutes and codes. Few cases since 
Tadić have questioned this approach to defining of a war crime.124 The next 
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section explains why, despite this consensus, this approach to defining war 
crimes is mistaken. 
B. The Limits of “Criminalization” 
The criminalization approach is theoretically and practically flawed. It fails 
to provide a coherent test or principle that determines what counts as a war crime 
and has therefore produced fragmentation across the international and domestic 
jurisdictions charged with adjudicating war crimes. The absence of a clear test 
gives rise to uncertainty about which IHL violations currently constitute war 
crimes as well as which IHL offenses might in the future be prosecuted as war 
crimes. In short, with criminalization as a central condition of a “war crime,” the 
legitimate corpus of war crimes remains elusive and indeterminate. 
1. Circularity 
The criminalization approach to defining a war crime is fundamentally 
circular: a violation of IHL is prosecutable as an international war crime only if 
it has previously been prosecuted as a war crime (ideally in an international 
forum) or previously criminalized in the statute of an international criminal 
tribunal. For example, Schwarz explains that “violations of international 
humanitarian law, which have been criminalized or termed as war crimes by the 
Statute of an international criminal court, may be justifiably regarded as war 
crimes under the jurisdiction of the relevant international court.”125 But this 
reasoning—common to definitions of war crimes that turn on criminalization—
offers no deep theoretical grounding. 
This is not simply a theoretical concern; it also curtails the dynamism of 
international criminal law in practice. Because of its circularity, the 
“criminalization” approach is likely to yield an under-inclusive set of offenses 
as candidates for international war crimes. If an act cannot generate individual 
criminal responsibility as a war crime until it has been prosecuted as a war crime, 
then the set of potential war crimes is necessarily very constrained. The 
expectation that a crime ought to have been prosecuted previously in order to 
establish a sufficiently strong customary international basis for inclusion in a 
statute or prosecution by an international tribunal limits the ability of judicial 
bodies to try untested and more novel offenses—such as conscription of child 
soldiers. Dapo Akande has pointed out that “there seems to be no reason why 
international tribunals may not apply treaties which create crimes that have not 
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yet been accepted under customary international law.”126 But requiring prior 
criminalization necessarily excludes such crimes from being recognized. Indeed, 
the few new offenses that have been recently recognized as war crimes were 
recognized by courts that largely elided the criminalization condition.127 
The necessity of looking to some prior evidence for criminalization can 
also lead national courts to distrust their own judgment and look only to 
preexisting international jurisdictional statutes, particularly the most recent: the 
Rome Statute. At the Assembly of States Parties of the ICC in December 2017, 
State parties considered multiple proposals to amend Article 8 of the Rome 
Statute to include three new war crimes.128 In the debates leading to these 
amendments, many State parties had expressed concern over whether the new 
crimes ought to be included, because the crimes had not yet been criminalized 
under customary international law.129 
Cassese warned of this danger in 1999: “national courts—as well as the 
ICTY and ICTR—might be tempted to rely on the ICC’s restrictive provisions 
as codifying existing international law” and in doing so, would adopt a 
“restrictive attitude” toward war crimes that would “no doubt . . . constitute a 
serious setback.”130 Abi-Saab likewise warned that Article 8 of the Rome Statute 
is “far from being a faithful snapshot” of customary international war crimes at 
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the time of its drafting—or today. Abi-Saab instead compares Article 8 to a 
“mere ‘artist’s sketch’” of the more general category of war crimes in general 
international law.131 But criminalization undermines such adaptability of the law, 
as its methodology is inherently backwards-looking. As a result, tethering the 
concept of war crimes to particular jurisdictions or to the statutes creating these 
jurisdictions may well lead to the under-development of substantive war crime 
law. 
2. Fragmentation 
The reliance on “criminalization” not only produces circular reasoning 
(which in turn undermines the dynamism of international criminal law), but it 
has also led to a great degree of variation across courts adjudicating war crimes. 
Fragmentation can happen for two reasons. First, when courts focus their 
criminalization inquiry on their own statutory framework and prosecutorial 
history, as many do,132 the circularity noted above can produce divergent 
definitions of war crimes because the statutes and history vary significantly from 
court to court. Jurisdictional statutes do not cleanly map onto one another. The 
problem of fragmentation is further exacerbated when courts prioritize their own 
precedent flowing from these statutes. For example, although the ICTR has 
jurisdiction to prosecute IHL violations of “collective punishments” and 
“terrorism,” the Rome Statute specifically omits these provisions.133 The ICTY 
has jurisdiction over the war crime of “employment of poisonous weapons or 
other weapons calculated to cause unnecessary suffering,” which would 
encompass nuclear weapons or cluster munitions, but the Rome Statute’s 
weapons provisions do not include these weapons. Article 8’s section on crimes 
in NIAC fails to include many crimes that the ICTY has declared are customary, 
such as the crime of intentionally attacking civilian objects. Indeed, when 
compared against existing customary international law (informed by the statutes 
and jurisprudential outputs of other tribunals), the Rome Statute is under-
inclusive.134 
Second, when courts look outside their own statutory framework, their 
attempts to prove criminality can easily become a functional grab-bag, with 
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courts drawing on a vast array of disparate sources as evidence of criminal 
responsibility. Across the scholarship and case law, various sources of law have 
been identified as relevant to an inquiry about the appropriateness of individual 
criminal liability, including inter alia jurisdictional statutes, customary 
international law, and domestic precedent, among other sources. As noted by 
Meron, “whether international law creates individual criminal responsibility 
depends on such considerations as whether the prohibitory norm in question, 
which may be conventional or customary, is directed to individuals, whether the 
prohibition is unequivocal in character, the gravity of the act, and the interests of 
the international community.”135 
In practice, courts frequently point to a variety of potential and purported 
sources of criminalization without showing how these sources are ultimately 
sufficient, or why they are necessary. Courts also draw to differing degrees on 
domestic laws and their treatment of war crimes. These references to domestic 
law are rarely systematic or comprehensive, leaving a great deal of uncertainty 
as to why the courts have relied on the domestic laws or decisions they have. For 
example, in Tadić, in an effort to show that States “intend to criminalize serious 
breaches of customary rules and principles,”136 the tribunal cited to “many 
elements of international practice” including multiple domestic military 
manuals,137 domestic statutes, and two U.N. Security Council Resolutions 
concerning Somalia in a manner that can hardly be described as systematic. The 
tribunal also emphasized that during the Nigerian Civil War both army members 
and rebels belonged to the Federal Army and rebels were brought before 
Nigerian courts, but did not reference other similar examples.138 The tribunal did 
not explain why it relied upon the examples it did. 
In the case against the commanders of the Čelebići prison camp 
(Prosecutor v. Mucić, also known as the “Čelebići Case”), the ICTY Trial and 
Appeals Chambers referred to an entirely different set of sources.139 The Mucić 
chambers focused in particular on the Rome Statute as well as other international 
documents, such as the ILC Draft Code of Crimes, as evidence of prior 
 
 135. Meron, Is International Law Moving, supra note 85, at 24. Somewhat differently, Schwarz 
tethers the determination of “criminalization” more to existing criminal and jurisdictional statutes, as well 
as past judicial conclusions: 
[I]ndividual criminal responsibility for war crimes can be derived from customary 
international law providing criminal sanctions for serious violations of international 
humanitarian law . . . by taking into account the different sources of State practice that 
contributes to the existence of customary international law: (i) military manuals; (ii) national 
legislation; (iii) judicial decisions; (iv) official pronouncements of States; and (v) the general 
criminal principles of criminal justice common to domestic legal systems. 
Schwarz, supra note 2, ¶ 22 (citations omitted). 
 136. Tadić Interlocutory Appeals Decision, supra note 102, ¶ 130. 
 137. Id. ¶ 131. 
 138. Id. ¶ 130. 
 139. The Trial Chamber stressed that: 
the United Nations cannot “criminalize” any of the provisions of international humanitarian 
law by the simple act of granting subject-matter jurisdiction to an international tribunal. The 
International Tribunal merely identifies and applies existing customary international law and, 
as stated above, this is not dependent upon an express recognition in the Statute of the content 
of that custom, although express reference may be made, as in the statute of the ICTR. 
Mucić Trial Chamber Judgment, supra note 85, at ¶ 310. 
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criminalization. Perhaps the most confusing aspect of the Mucić Appeals 
Chamber’s discussion of criminalization was its suggestion of another potential 
source of individual criminal responsibility: general principles of international 
law. According to the Mucić Trial Chamber, while the Nuremberg Tribunals 
carried out prosecutions in the absence of any language in the 1929 Geneva and 
1907 Hague Conventions contemplating international criminal liability, the 
ICTY was nonetheless able to prosecute breaches of these treaties because 
“general principles of law” supplied the criminality of these breaches.140 The 
Chamber concluded that “it is undeniable that acts such as murder, torture, rape 
and inhuman treatment are criminal according to ‘general principles of law’ 
recognized by all legal systems.”141 
More recently, in Prosecutor v. Galić, the ICTY Appeals Chamber appears 
to have gathered together as many sources as it could to bolster its position that 
the crime of terrorism against civilian populations ought to be considered an IHL 
offense prosecutable by that court.142 The SCSL case against Samuel Hinga 
Norman,143 a former Deputy Minister of Defence in the Government of Sierra 
Leone who was accused of enlisting and using child soldiers, similarly relied on 
a wide variety of sources, including a number of selected military guides that 
prohibit child soldier recruitment.144 
The lack of a consistent methodology regarding the sources sufficient to 
show criminalization means that it is difficult to tell what belongs in the set of 
“war crimes.” We are not the first to notice this problem, of course. Professor 
Robert Cryer has argued: 
The fourth Tadić condition, that it is necessary to identify a separate rule 
criminalising a violation of humanitarian law, is one that has led to some of the most 
questionable argumentation in international tribunals. The Tribunals have been 
rather better about establishing the customary status of a rule than showing evidence 
of the separate rule that criminalises it.145 
 
 140. Id. ¶ 313. 
 141. Id. The Blaškić case provides another instructive example. There, the Trial Chamber seemed 
particularly concerned with establishing that the acts were criminal under the domestic regime in force at 
the time and place of the relevant events. In response to the defense’s argument that the Common Article 
3 prohibitions did not entail criminality liability, the Trial Chamber pointed to the fact that the domestic 
criminal code of Yugoslavia provided for criminal liability for the perpetrators of war crimes. Prosecutor 
v. Blaškić, Case No. IT-95-14-T, Trial Chamber Judgment, ¶ 176 (Int’l Crim. Trib. For the Former 
Yugoslavia Mar. 3, 2000), http://www.icty.org/x/cases/blaskic/tjug/en/bla-tj000303e.pdf. 
 142. The Appeals Chamber reiterated that “[i]ndividual criminal responsibility under the fourth 
Tadić condition can be inferred from, inter alia, state practice indicating an intention to criminalise the 
prohibition, including statements by government officials and international organisations, as well as 
punishment of violations by national courts and military tribunals.” Galić Appeals Chamber Judgment, 
supra note 116, ¶ 92; see also id. ¶¶ 91-98. Further, the Appeals Chamber also identified as supplying the 
requirement criminalization various authorities from international and domestic law, including the 1919 
Report of the Commission on Responsibilities drafted by the Paris Peace Conference, Australia’s War 
Crimes Act, and the Norwegian Military Penal Code of 1902. Id. ¶¶ 93-94. 
 143. Hinga Norman Appeals Chamber Decision, supra note 7. 
 144. See id. ¶¶ 43-47. 
 145. Robert Cryer, Prosecutor v. Galić and the War Crime of Terror Bombing, 2 ISR. DEF. 
FORCES L.R. 75, 90 (2005-2006); see also Matthew Happold, International Humanitarian Law, War 
Criminality and Child Recruitment: The Special Court for Sierra Leone’s Decision in Prosecutor v. 
Samuel Hinga Norman, 18 LEIDEN J. INT’L L. 283, 288-95 (2005) (criticizing the treatment of the fourth 
Tadić́ prong in the Hinga Norman decision and arguing that the evidence mustered should be viewed as 
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Cassese, too, recognizes that “international rules d[o] not specify with sufficient 
clarity the objective and subjective requirements for individual criminal 
responsibility to arise.”146 
3. Non-Retroactivity, or “Legality” 
The fragmentation described above is not merely a practical problem; it 
goes to the core of the legitimacy of war crimes prosecutions. If the sources of 
criminalization are unpredictable and the law fragmented, the “criminalization” 
requirement cannot serve its most important purpose: putting potential 
defendants on advance notice of their criminal liability.147 This is the principle 
of nullum crimen sine lege, also known simply as the principle of “legality.” The 
criminalization condition, if applied haphazardly and unpredictably by courts, 
does not always provide the consistency that would be necessary to provide 
advance notice and thus satisfy the legality condition. 
To satisfy the principle of legality, the “scope of [a] crime and the 
applicable punishment must be set out in clear terms before its commission,” in 
order for a person to be held criminally liable for committing it.148 The IMT 
noted that the principle of nullum crimen is a “principle of justice,” meaning that 
an accused must have had notice of the crime at issue before committing it.149 
But one of the great failings of the IMT was its refusal to seriously address the 
concern. Its judgment endorsed the proposition that it is permissible to punish 
evil acts even if they were not crimes when committed: “To assert that it is unjust 
to punish those who in defiance of treaties and assurances have attacked 
neighbouring states without warning is obviously untrue,” it wrote, “for in such 
circumstances the attacker must know that he is doing wrong, and so far from it 
being unjust to punish him, it would be unjust if his wrong were allowed to go 
unpunished.”150 That failure was a tragedy, not simply for the legitimacy of the 
judgment but for the legitimacy of international criminal law more generally, as 
it lent a flavor of victors’ justice to the prospect of international criminal liability. 
This is all the more tragic given that the IMT had much better arguments 
 
actually insufficient to satisfy the prong). 
 146. CASSESE, supra note 68, at 5. 
 147. Overall, the criminalization requirement seems driven in large part by the tribunals’ concern 
over ensuring that individuals are not prosecuted for offenses for which they were not on notice at the 
relevant time, per the principle of nullum crimen sine lege. In the Galić case, for instance, the defendant 
challenged his terrorism conviction on appeal by claiming it violated the nullum crimen sine lege 
principle. See Galić Trial Chamber Judgment, supra note 112, ¶¶ 79-85. The Appeals Chamber’s 
criminalization analysis was thus provided to overcome this ground of appeal. For a similar discussion in 
the context of the child soldiers crime, see Happold, supra note 145, at 296 (“One can see why 
international criminal tribunals are anxious to proclaim that a specific rule criminalizing such conduct is 
required for violations of international humanitarian law to engage individual criminal responsibility. 
Otherwise, claims that their actions breach the fundamental rule of nullum crimen sine lege and are more 
akin to legislation than adjudication would gain greater currency and cogency.”). 
 148. William Schabas, Nullem Crimen Sine Lege, in UNIMAGINABLE ATROCITIES: JUSTICE, 
POLITICS, AND RIGHTS AT THE WAR CRIMES TRIBUNALS (2012). 
 149. Judgment, supra note 63, at 219. 
 150. Id.; see HATHAWAY & SHAPIRO, supra note 48, at 276-97 (describing the trial at 
Nuremberg). 
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available to it.151 
In the aftermath of World War II, most international criminal courts 
followed the IMT’s lead, and failed to take a rigorous or strict approach to nullum 
crimen. Instead, as Beth Van Schaack has persuasively explained, tribunals have 
employed a host of methods for determining nullum crimen, even, 
“occasionally,” to the point of “produc[ing] substantive justice at the expense of 
strict legality.”152 
The principle of legality requires, at minimum, notice and foreseeability of 
criminal conduct within international criminal law.153 As noted earlier, the focus 
on “criminalization” can be understood as a renewed attempt to meet this 
requirement. But it unfortunately fails at the task; it provides an unclear basis for 
determining what conduct constitutes a war crime—particularly as tribunals 
have often looked to a variety of international legal documents as well as both 
domestic and international legal examples to satisfy the principle of legality. The 
principle of legality “does not prevent a court . . . from determining an issue 
through a process of interpretation and clarification as to the elements of a 
particular crime.”154 However, it raises deep questions about the appropriateness 




As currently conceived, a definition of war crimes tethered to 
“criminalization” is circular, prone to fragmentation, and fails to reliably satisfy 
the requirements of legality. For these reasons, we propose a conception of a war 
crime that does not rely on a reference to the concept of “criminalization.” 
Furthermore, as international criminal tribunals represent only a portion of the 
world’s prosecutions for war-related conduct—and as both domestic and 
 
 151. See HATHAWAY & SHAPIRO, supra note 48, at 276-97. 
 152. Van Schaak, supra note 122, at 103; see also Meron, International Criminalizatinon, supra 
note 84, at 564 (noting that “neither the Geneva Conventions that preceded those of 1949 nor the fourth 
Hague Convention contained explicit penal provisions” and that “they were accepted as a basis for 
prosecutions and convictions in the post-World War II Tribunals”). The ICTY Trial Chamber, apparently 
frustrated by the limits imposed by the prior criminalization condition, has dismissed the legality concern, 
observing in Mucić that “[i]t strains credibility to contend that the accused would not recognise the 
criminal nature of the acts alleged in the Indictment. The fact that they could not foresee the creation of 
an International Tribunal which would be the forum for prosecution is of no consequence.” Mucić Trial 
Chamber Judgment, supra note 85, at ¶ 313. Similarly, the Tadić Appeals Chamber seems to have 
acknowledged that, irrespective of the evidence proffered in support of the criminalization element, the 
accused should have been on constructive notice. It stated: “Principles and rules of humanitarian law 
reflect ‘elementary considerations of humanity’ widely recognized as the mandatory minimum for 
conduct in armed conflicts of any kind. No one can doubt the gravity of the acts at issue, nor the interest 
of the international community in their prohibition.” Tadić Interlocutory Appeals Decision, supra note 
102, at ¶ 129; see also Happold, supra note 145, at 296. Both echo the much-criticized IMT judgment’s 
dismissal of similar concerns, opening international war crimes prosecutions up to concerns about their 
legitimacy. See infra Section III.C. for our alternative approach to addressing these concerns. 
 153. See, e.g., International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 15, Dec. 19, 1966, 999 
U.N.T.S. 171. 
 154. Prosecutor v. Aleksovski, Case No. IT-95-14/1-A, Appeal Judgment, ¶ 127 (Int’l Crim. Trib. 
for the Former Yugoslavia Mar. 24, 2000) (emphasis added); see also Prosecutor v. Aleksovski, Case No. 
IT-95-14/1, Trial Chamber Judgment, ¶ 57 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia June 25, 1999) 
[hereinafter Aleksovski Trial Judgment]. 
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international tribunals rely on one another when prosecuting war crimes—it is 
important to establish a definition of a war crime that can transcend not only 
international tribunals, but which can also be applied in domestic courts. The 
next section attempts to offer such a definition. 
III. DEFINING WAR CRIMES: A TRANS-JURISDICTIONAL STANDARD 
It is possible to define international war crimes by dispensing with the 
language of “criminalization” and instead focusing on salient features of war 
crimes that do not require reference to statutes, jurisdictions, or evidence of 
previous prosecutions. Under this approach, domestic and international tribunals 
with jurisdiction over war crimes are best understood as having jurisdiction over 
sub-sets of the universe of potential war crimes. They may be limited to a 
particular geographic area, a limited period of time, a restricted set of actors, or 
a particular set of crimes. Indeed, no international tribunal has been designed to 
possess jurisdiction over all war crimes. Even the Rome Statute, the most 
comprehensive of the statutes, specifically recognizes the potential for evolution 
in international war crimes outside of its jurisdictional reach: “[n]othing in this 
Part [of the Rome Statute] shall be interpreted as limiting or prejudicing in any 
way existing or developing rules of international law for purposes other than this 
Statute.”155 
Here we identify the core features of war crimes untethered from prior 
criminalization. These are minimum standards by which nearly every court 
abides, deliberately or not. We show that, despite differences in war crimes 
across jurisdictions and statutes, agreement exists as to the core features of war 
crimes. A war crime has two key elements: (1) a breach of IHL that is (2) 
“serious.” We take each element in turn. 
A. A Breach of International Humanitarian Law 
IHL supplies the underlying prohibitions of offenses cognizable as war 
crimes. The authoritative Pictet Commentary to the Geneva Conventions 
clarifies, for instance, that the First Geneva Convention was the “first instrument 
to incorporate a coherent system of rules for the repression of violations of its 
provisions,”156 and the Convention “forms part of what are generally known as 
the laws and customs of war, breaches of which are commonly called ‘war 
crimes.’”157 The Charter of the IMT similarly defines war crimes as based 
principally on IHL. Article 6(b) of the Charter specifies that war crimes are 
“namely, violations of the laws or customs of war.”158 Article 6(b) also includes 
a list of illustrative examples.159 Likewise, U.N. Security Council Resolution 
 
 155. Rome Statute, supra note 73, art. 10. 
 156. JEAN S. PICTET, COMMENTARY: I GENEVA CONVENTION RELATIVE TO THE PROTECTION OF 
CIVILIAN PERSONS IN TIME OF WAR 353 (1952). 
 157. Id. at 351 (emphasis added). 
 158. Charter of the International Military Tribunal—Annex to the Agreement for the Prosecution 
and Punishment of the Major War Criminals of the European Axis art. 6(b), 58 Stat. 1544, 82 U.N.T.S. 
280 (Aug. 8, 1945). 
 159. By contrast, the other crimes over which Article 6 established the IMT’s jurisdiction (crimes 
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827, which established the ICTY in 1993, called specifically for a tribunal to be 
established for prosecuting “persons responsible for serious violations of 
international humanitarian law.”160 The ICTR and ICC Statutes include 
violations of IHL as offenses covered under this mandate161 and treat the 
violation of IHL as the “first step” in establishing a war crime.162 
In the domestic context, military manuals also treat IHL as the starting 
point for potential war crimes prosecutions. Indeed, the U.S. Army Military 
Manual from 1956 suggests that IHL violations and war crimes are synonymous. 
It reads, “The term ‘war crime’ is the technical expression for a violation of the 
law of war by any person or persons, military or civilian. Every violation of the 
law of war is a war crime.”163 The German Military Manual from 1992 takes a 
similar approach, suggesting that courts can prosecute any member of the armed 
forces who has violated IHL.164 
IHL prohibitions can be based on treaties, such as the Geneva Conventions, 
or customary law. In practice, tribunals often seek to determine that a prohibition 
is customary, in addition to locating the prohibition’s roots in treaty law, or even 
in the tribunal or court’s own statute. In the ICTR’s Judgment in Akayesu, for 
example, the Trial Chamber noted that it “should apply rules of International 
Humanitarian law which are beyond any doubt part of customary law.”165 In 
considering whether terrorism constituted a war crime, the Galić Appeals 
Chamber explained, 
[T]he International Tribunal’s jurisdiction for crimes under Article 3 of the Statute 
can only be based on customary international law. . . . [W]hile binding conventional 
law that prohibits conduct and provides for individual criminal responsibility could 
provide the basis for the International Tribunal’s jurisdiction, in practice the 
International Tribunal always ascertains that the treaty provision in question is also 
declaratory of custom.166 
 
against peace and crimes against humanity), are defined solely through reference to examples—as 
opposed to the body of law of war. 
 160. ICTY Statute, supra note 71. 
 161. ICTR Statute, supra note 72, art. 1; Rome Statute, supra note 73, art. 3. Article 8 of the 
Rome Statute specifically defines “war crimes” as not simply grave breaches, but other “serious violations 
of the laws and customs applicable in international armed conflict.” Rome Statute, supra note 73, art. 3. 
 162. Multiple statutes take as a starting point the existence of IHL prohibitions. See, e.g., ICTY 
Statute, supra note 71, art. 3; ICTR Statute, supra note 72, art.4; and Rome Statute, supra note 73, art 8. 
See, e.g., Lubanga Trial Chamber Judgment, supra note 122, ¶¶ 568, 604; Galić Trial Chamber Judgment, 
supra note 112, ¶¶ 44-52; Akayesu Appeals Chamber Judgment, supra note 124, ¶ 438. 
 163. DEP’T OF THE ARMY (U.S.), FIELD MANUAL 27-10, THE LAW OF LAND WARFARE, 178 
(1956). Notably, at the adoption of the Statute of the ICTY by the UN Security Council, the U.S. 
Representative to the United Nations interpreted Article 3 of that statute, which covers the laws of war, to 
mean that all violations of that article were criminal under international law. Meron, supra note 83, at 560. 
 164. FED. MINISTRY OF DEF. (GER.), MANUAL DSK – VV207320067, HUMANITARIAN LAW IN 
ARMED CONFLICTS – MANUAL, § 1207 (1992). 
 165. Akayesu Trial Chamber Judgment, supra note 124, ¶ 605. 
 166. Galić Appeals Chamber Judgment, supra note 116, at ¶ 85. As another example, the Appeals 
Chamber of the ICTY specifically pointed out in the case against Kordić and Čerkez that “the International 
Tribunal . . . has jurisdiction over violations which are prohibited by international treaties” before looking 
to customary international law to determine that the conduct at issue indeed gave rise to individual 
criminal responsibility. Prosecutor v. Kordić & Čerkez, Case No. IT-95-14/2-T, Trial Chamber Judgment, 
¶ 167 (Feb. 26, 2001); cf. Prosecutor v. Kordić & Čerkez, Case No. IT-95-14/2-A, Appeals Chamber 
Judgment, ¶ 41 (Dec. 17, 2004). Likewise, the role of custom also seems rooted in Article 8 of the Rome 
Statute. During the drafting of this Article, only IHL prohibitions deemed “customary” in nature were 
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Across commentary and cases, it is widely recognized that for conduct to 
amount to a violation of IHL to which criminal responsibility can attach, there 
must be a sufficient “nexus” between the conduct at issue and the relevant armed 
conflict.167 The “nexus” requirement helps establish a connection between the 
violation of IHL, which is a body of law generally applicable to the behavior of 
States, and the act committed by an individual.168 In the words of one ICTY Trial 
Chamber, a “sufficient link” between the crime and armed conflict is necessary 
“in order for a particular crime to qualify as a violation of international 
humanitarian law.”169 This nexus is evaluated with respect to a particular act.170 
In the international cases of Lubanga,171 Akayesu,172 Mucić et al.,173 Prlić 
et al.,174 Rutaganda,175 and Kordić & Čerkez, for instance, the nexus requirement 
figured prominently in the discussion of required conditions for a war crime.176 
 
included in the final version of the Statute. Dörmann, supra note 82, at 345. 
 167. See, e.g., Gloria Gaggioli, Sexual Violence in Armed Conflicts: A Violation of International 
Humanitarian Law and Human Rights Law, 96 INT’L REV. RED CROSS 503, 514 (2014) (“It is true that 
the notion of nexus cannot be found in IHL treaties and has been mainly developed in international 
criminal case law for the purpose of determining the jurisdiction of the tribunal or, in other words, 
establishing whether a war crime has been committed.”). 
 168. Nexus “serves to distinguish war crimes from purely domestic crimes over which 
international criminal courts and tribunals have no jurisdiction.” Guenael Mettraux, Nexus with Armed 
Conflict, in THE OXFORD COMPANION TO INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE 435-36 (Antonio Cassese 
ed., 2009). According to Cassese, nexus distinguishes war crimes from “ordinary criminal conduct 
(offences falling under the law of the relevant territory).” As he writes, “[t]his relationship . . . serves to 
distinguish between war crimes, on the one side, and ‘ordinary’ criminal conduct that therefore falls under 
the law applicable in the relevant territory.” CASSESE, supra note 68, at 77. 
 169. Kordić & Čerkez, Case No. IT-95-14/2-T, supra note 166, ¶ 32 (noting also that a “sufficient 
link” between the crime and armed conflict is necessary “in order for a particular crime to qualify as a 
violation of international humanitarian law”). 
 170. Prosecutor v. Kunarac, Case No. IT-96-23 & IT-96-23/1-A, Appeals Chamber Judgment, 
¶ 59 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia June 12, 2002) (noting that nexus is relevant in 
“determining whether or not the act in question is sufficiently related to the armed conflict” (emphasis 
added)), www.icty.org/x/cases/kunarac/acjug/en/kun-aj020612e.pdf. 
 171. Lubanga Trial Chamber Judgment, supra note 122, ¶¶ 1349-50. 
 172. “Evidence presented during trial established that, at the time of the events alleged in the 
Indictment, Akayesu wore a military jacket, carried a rifle, he assisted the military on their arrival in Taba 
by undertaking a number of tasks, including reconnaissance and mapping of the commune, and the setting 
up of radio communications, and he allowed the military to use his office premises. The Prosecutor relied 
in part on these facts to demonstrate that there was a nexus between the actions of Akayesu and the 
conflict.” Akayesu Trial Chamber Judgment, supra note 124, ¶ 641. 
 173. The nexus of rape committed against a prisoner was that the heads of the camp were part of 
the military apparatus involved in the nearby armed conflict. Mucić Trial Chamber Judgment, supra note 
85, ¶¶ 190-207. 
 174. The Trial Chamber held in Prlić et al. that “[i]t is not necessary for the acts of an accused 
to have been committed at the height of the attack . . . so long as there is even a minimally sufficient 
nexus.” Prosecutor v. Prlić et al., Case No. IT-04-74-T, Trial Chamber Judgment, ¶ 43 (Int’l Crim. Trib. 
for the Former Yugoslavia May 29, 2013), www.icty.org/x/cases/prlic/tjug/en/130529-1.pdf. 
 175. A key issue on appeal was whether or not the Trial Chamber had made a factual error when 
it asserted that the nexus had not been established beyond a reasonable doubt. Rutaganda v. Prosecutor, 
Case No. ICTR-96-3-A, Appeals Chamber Judgment, ¶ 560 (May 26, 2003), http://unictr.irmct.org
/sites/unictr.org/files/case-documents/ictr-96-3/appeals-chamber-judgements/en/030526.pdf. 
 176. In evaluating the facts of the case, the Trial Chamber found that there was “no doubt that a 
clear nexus exists between the armed conflict between the Bosnian Croats and the Bosnian Muslims in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina and the acts alleged in the indictment.” Prosecutor v. Kordić, Case No. IT-95-
14/2-T, Trial Chamber Judgment, ¶ 35 (Int’l Crim. Trib. For the Former Yugoslavia Feb. 26, 2001). In 
the seminal Galić case, discussed supra, the Appeals Chamber did not identify nexus as a war crime 
element. However, this is almost certainly because in its discussion of the actus reus, the establishment 
of a nexus was implicit. In that case, Galić was accused of sniping civilians in a heavily populated area of 
2019] What is a War Crime? 85 
The nexus requirement also finds expression in the Rome Statute “Elements of 
Crimes” document, whose Article 8 section affirms that “[f]or a war crime to be 
established under Article 8,” it must be committed “in the context of and 
associated with” an armed conflict.177 Whereas the first term, “in the context of,” 
is generally interpreted as referring to the existence of armed conflict, the term 
“associated with” refers to the nexus requirement for the particular act.178 
The precise function of “nexus” as part of the IHL requirement remains a 
matter of some ongoing debate.179 Some commentators treat it as a separate and 
independent requirement for a war crime. However, the “nexus” requirement is 
best understood as triggering the application of IHL to particular acts of 
misconduct by an individual defendant.180 Across tribunals and commentary, 
there is consensus that the fact that an abuse would not have occurred but for the 
existence of armed conflict is not sufficient to make an act a war crime; the action 
must violate the law of war.181 There is “no presumption that, because a crime is 
 
Sarejevo, with the purpose of terrorizing the local civilian population. Because these were acts against 
civilians with a military purpose, the armed conflict nexus was arguably self-evident. See generally Galić 
Appeals Chamber Judgment, supra note 116, ¶¶ 125-30. Cassese has acknowledged that while nexus is 
not also explicitly discussed by courts, they always require it to be present. See CASSESE, supra note 68, 
at 77-79. 
 177. Rome Statute, supra note 73, art. 8. 
 178. Dörmann, supra note 82, at 358-60. See KNUT DÖRMANN, ELEMENTS OF WAR CRIMES 
UNDER THE ROME STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 382 (2003); Abi-Saab, supra note 
97, at 112-13. 
 179. See, e.g., Harmen van der Wilt, War Crimes and the Requirement of a Nexus with an Armed 
Conflict, 10 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 1113, 1113 (2012) (“The case law of the international criminal tribunals 
reveals that this nexus requirement is an open concept, resulting in diverging interpretations by both 
international and domestic criminal courts.”). 
Tribunals that have looked to assess “nexus” often look to a number of diverse factors when considering 
whether the “nexus” requirement is satisfied. For example, as the ICTY Appeals Chamber summarized in 
the Kunarac case: 
In determining whether or not the act in question is sufficiently related to the armed conflict, 
the Trial Chamber may take into account, inter alia, the following factors: the fact that the 
perpetrator is a combatant; the fact that the victim is a non-combatant; the fact that the victim 
is a member of the opposing party; the fact that the act may be said to serve the ultimate goal 
of a military campaign; and the fact that the crime is committed as part of or in the context of 
the perpetrator’s official duties. 
Appeals Chamber Judgment, supra note 170, ¶ 59. 
 180. For a similar view, see Gaggioli, supra note 167, at 514-15. According to the ICTY in the 
Tadić case, an IAC exists when there is a “resort to armed force between States.” Tadić Interlocutory 
Appeals Decision, supra note 102, ¶ 70 . This understanding of the application of jus in bello rules in 
cases of IAC has been described as the “first-shot” theory, under which jus in bello rules apply from the 
moment that force is used by one State against another. Jann K. Kleffner, Scope of Application of 
International Humanitarian Law, in THE HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 45-46 
(Dieter Fleck ed., 3d ed. 2013) (citing PICTET, supra note 157, at 32). The ICRC similarly maintains that 
“any difference arising between two states and leading to the intervention of members of the armed forces 
is an armed conflict.” Id. at 42 (citing PICTET, COMMENTARY, supra note 156, at 32). 
 181. For instance, if an officer rapes his subordinate, relying on his superior authority and as a 
form of punishment, but unrelated to the armed conflict, the nexus requirement would not be satisfied. 
Gaggioli, supra note 167, at 515 (2014). See CASSESE, supra note 68, at 77-78. According to the ICTR, 
“the expression ‘under the guise of the armed conflict’ does not mean simply ‘at the same time as an 
armed conflict’ and/or ‘in any circumstances created in part by the armed conflict.’” Rutaganda v. 
Prosecutor, Case No. ICTR-96-3-A, Appeals Chamber Judgment, ¶ 570 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for Rwanda 
May 26, 2003), http://unictr.irmct.org/sites/unictr.org/files/case-documents/ictr-96-3/appeals-chamber-
judgements/en/030526.pdf; see also Prosecutor v. Kayishema & Ruzindana, Case No. ICTR-95-1-T, Trial 
Chamber Judgment, ¶¶ 185-89, 590-624 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for Rwanda May 21, 1999), 
http://unictr.irmct.org/sites/unictr.org/files/case-documents/ictr-95-1/trial-judgements/en/990521.pdf; 
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committed in time of armed conflict, it automatically constitutes a war crime.”182 
The key question, instead, is whether the accused has committed a violation of 
applicable IHL. 
Notably, this formulation excludes those not governed by IHL from 
prosecution for a war crime. A civilian who commits a crime against a fellow 
civilian in time of war is not governed by IHL unless that civilian is a member 
of an organized armed group and thereby subject to the obligations of an actor 
in a NIAC.183 Such an actor could be subject to criminal prosecution in domestic 
court but not for the commission of a war crime. 
B. Seriousness 
The second core attribute of a “war crime” is that the IHL breach must 
constitute a serious violation. As an empirical matter, severity is consistently 
identified by tribunals and scholars as a requirement of war crimes. Scholars and 
treatises regularly describe war crimes as “serious violations of IHL,”184 
implying that the IHL rule itself must be of a particularly serious character, as 
compared to other IHL rules. The international criminal tribunals have reiterated 
 
Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, Trial Chamber Judgment, ¶¶ 630-34 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for 
Rwanda Sept. 2, 1998), http://unictr.irmct.org/sites/unictr.org/files/case-documents/ictr-96-4/trial-
judgements/en/980902.pdf; Mucić Trial Chamber Judgment, supra note 85, ¶¶ 193-98. There are differing 
views of how close the nexus to the armed conflict must be. Some adopt what might be called a 
“restrictive” view, which limits the classification of war crimes to those acts that advance the aims of a 
conflict or the goals of a particular side’s military campaign, broadly defined. According to Cassese, for 
example, the offense must have been “committed in pursuit of the aims of the conflict or, alternatively, it 
must have been carried out with a view to somehow contributing to attaining the ultimate goals of a 
military campaign or, at a minimum, in unison with the military campaign.” CASSESE, supra note 68, at 
77-78. A broader approach to the nexus requirement simply requires that the act at issue either relate in 
some way to the aim of a military campaign or a broader military purpose, or be central to the ability of 
the perpetrator to commit the act. See Kunarac, Case No. IT-96-23 & IT-96-23/1-A, supra note 170, ¶ 58 
(“The armed conflict need not have been causal to the commission of the crime, but the existence of an 
armed conflict must, at a minimum, have played a substantial part in the perpetrator’s ability to commit 
it, his decision to commit it, the manner in which it was committed or the purpose for which it was 
committed.”). 
 182. Mettraux, supra note 168, at 435-36. See generally AMBOS, supra note 86, at 140-41; 
Schwarz, supra note 2, at ¶¶ 23-27. 
 183. Interestingly, this would exclude one of the four categories identified by Oppenheim in 
1906: hostilities committed by individuals not members of the enemy armed forces. See OPPENHEIM, 
supra note 41, at 266. It would also exclude espionage and war treason, unless committed by members of 
enemy armed forces or an organized armed group engaged in an armed conflict. 
 184. See, e.g., CASSESE, supra note 68, at 65 (“War crimes are serious violations of customary 
or treaty rules belonging to international humanitarian law.”); id. at 67 (“In order for an individual to be 
held criminally responsible for a war crime, first of all it is necessary that he seriously infringed a rule of 
IHL.” (emphasis added)); Abi-Saab, supra note 69, at 112 (“‘War crimes’ by contrast, as serious violations 
of the laws and customs of war, can only take place in the course of an armed conflict and only once it 
has started.”); Cottier, supra note 89, at 309 (“An additional, somewhat secondary criterion was whether 
the war crime in question was sufficiently serious to be included under the Draft Statute, since the Court 
was meant to deal only with the most serious crimes of concern to the international community as a 
whole.”). 
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a similar position, as evident in statements in Akayesu,185 Blaškić,186 Galić,187 
Kordić & Čerkez,188 Kunarac,189 and nearly every other criminal tribunal. In one 
recent example, the ICC Trial Chamber in the Lubanga judgment relied 
expressly on a definition of war crimes that assumed a “serious violation of the 
laws and customs” of war, based on the use of the word “serious” in the Rome 
Statute itself.190 The use of “serious” in describing violations of the law of war 
is found in numerous domestic military manuals as well.191 
The central role of seriousness in the definition of war crimes reflects the 
historical link between war crimes and the grave breaches regime.192 For 
instance, the ICC “Elements of Crimes,” a document articulating the structure 
and requirements of the crimes under ICC jurisdiction, states that a war crime 
based on sexual violence requires “gravity comparable to that of a grave breach 
 
 185. The Akayesu Trial Chamber noted that “the Tribunal has the power to prosecute persons 
responsible for serious violations” of IHL as well as “serious violations of Article 3.” Akayesu Trial 
Chamber Judgment, supra note 124, ¶ 4. The Chamber said it understood “the phrase ‘serious violation’ 
to mean ‘a breach of a rule protecting important values [which] must involve grave consequences for the 
victim,’” in line with Tadić. Id. ¶ 616. 
 186. In the Blaškić case, the accused were indicted only for “the most serious violations of 
international humanitarian law, punishable by the most severe of penalties.” Prosecutor v. Blaškić, Case 
No. IT-95-14-A, Appeals Chamber Judgment, ¶ 681 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia July 29, 
2004) [hereinafter Blaškić Appeals Chamber Judgment], http://www.icty.org/x/cases/blaskic/acjug/en
/bla-aj040729e.pdf. 
 187. The Galić Appeals Chamber relied on the Tadić conditions for determining a war crime, of 
which the third condition is that the violation be “serious.” Galić Appeals Chamber Judgment, supra note 
116, ¶ 91. In a separate opinion, Judge Shahabuddeen evaluated whether “terror” is a crime by considering 
whether a “serious violation of ‘the laws or customs of war’” gives rise to criminal responsibility. Id. at 
Separate Opinion of Judge Shahabuddeen, ¶ 5. 
 188. The Kordić & Čerkez Appeals Chamber confirmed the Trial Chamber’s approach, 
consistent with Article 1 and Sec. Res. 827, of prosecuting “persons responsible for serious violations of 
international humanitarian law.” Prosecutor v. Kordić & Čerkez, Case No. IT-95-14/2-A, Appeals 
Chamber Judgment, ¶ 43 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Dec. 17, 2004). 
 189. The Trial Chamber utilized the Tadić conditions, the third of which notes that a violation 
must be serious. Prosecutor v. Kunarac, Case No. IT-96-23/1-T, Trial Chamber Judgment, ¶ 403 (Int’l 
Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Feb. 22, 2001). 
 190. Lubanga Trial Chamber Judgment, supra note 122, ¶ 504; see Rome Statute art. 8(2)(b) 
(including within the Court’s jurisdiction “[o]ther serious violations of the laws and customs applicable 
in international armed conflict, within the established framework of international law, namely, any of the 
following acts . . . .”). 
 191. See, e.g., Rule 156. Definition of War Crimes, IHL DATABASE: CUSTOMARY IHL, INT’L 
COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/customary-ihl/eng/docs/v1_rul_rule156 (citing 
military manuals from Colombia, Croatia, France, Italy, and Spain as well as legislation from Congo, New 
Zealand, and Nicaragua); see also 18 U.S.C. § 2441 (2018) (“(c) Definition.— As used in this section the 
term “war crime” means any conduct . . . (3) which constitutes a grave breach of common Article 3 (as 
defined in subsection (d)) when committed in the context of and in association with an armed conflict not 
of an international character.”) (cited in U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., LAW OF WAR MANUAL 1076 (2015), 
http://archive.defense.gov/pubs/law-of-war-manual-june-2015.pdf (“In some cases, the term ‘war crime’ 
has been used as a technical expression for a violation of the law of war by any person; i.e., under this 
usage, any violation of the law of war is a war crime.”)). Notably, Rule 156 of the ICRC Customary IHL 
Study asserts the more categorical position that IHL violations that are serious are war crimes. Rule 156 
is “[s]erious violations of international humanitarian law constitute war crimes.” Rule 156. Definition of 
War Crimes, IHL DATABASE. Under this view, severity is the sole, or at least predominant, element 
delineating which IHL violations constitute war crimes. In support of this approach, Robert Cryer has 
argued that Rule 156 “seem[s] both clear and simple, and to take the correct position on the question of 
whether or not a separate rule criminalising the violation (serious or not) is required.” Robert Cryer, Of 
Custom, Treaties, Scholars and the Gavel: The Influence of the International Criminal Tribunals on the 
ICRC Customary Law Survey, 11 J. CONFLICT & SECURITY L. 239, 262 (2006). 
 192. See supra notes 67-70 and accompanying text. 
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of the Geneva Conventions” or “to that of a serious violation of [common] article 
3.”193 Likewise, one seminal commentary notes that one of the most important 
criteria in prosecuting a war crime “was whether the war crime in question was 
sufficiently serious to be included under the Draft Statute, since the Court was 
meant to deal only with the most serious crimes of concern to the international 
community as a whole.”194 
A potential concern with defining a war crime as a “severe” violation of 
IHL is that the severity requirement might invite subjective assessments. Any 
variation, however, is likely to decrease as international criminal law doctrine 
evolves and courts look to one another for guidance as to which violations of 
IHL are properly considered “severe.” 
To the extent there has been variation in the approach to severity, 
moreover, it has not been so much substantive as procedural: tribunals and 
commentators introduce the severity factor at different points in the analysis. 
Sometimes severity is provided as a precondition that attaches to underlying IHL 
rules: that is, some IHL violations are considered “serious” while others are not. 
The Rome Statute lists certain “serious” IHL prohibitions under Article 8.195 The 
Tadić Appeals Chamber takes a similar approach: “[T]he fact of a combatant 
simply appropriating a loaf of bread in an occupied village” would not amount 
to a serious breach that could be prosecuted as a war crime “although it may be 
regarded as falling afoul of the basic principle laid down in Article 46(1) of the 
1907 Hague Regulations [on land warfare].”196 
In other instances, commentators and tribunals assess seriousness as 
applied to the facts of the case and the act itself, focusing on the heinous manner 
in which the offense was carried out or on the gravity of its consequences. This 
essentially becomes a severity “as applied” analysis. In order to establish that 
rape constitutes a war crime, for example, the ICRC favored an evaluation of 
severity of the crime itself over statutory definitions. It reasoned that “[a]lthough 
rape was prohibited by the Geneva Conventions, it was not explicitly listed as a 
grave breach either in the Conventions or in AP I but would have to be 
considered a grave breach on the basis that it amounts to inhuman treatment or 
willfully causing great suffering or serious injury to body or health.”197 
 
 193. Elements of Crimes, INT’L CRIMINAL COURT 30, 38 (2011) (emphasis added), 
https://www.icc-cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/336923D8-A6AD-40EC-AD7B-45BF9DE73D56/0/ElementsOf
CrimesEng.pdf; see also Gloria Gaggioli, supra note 167, at 529. 
 194. Cottier, supra note 89, at 309. 
 195. Id. 
 196. Tadić Interlocutory Appeals Decision, supra note 102, ¶ 94. 
 197. HENCKAERTS & DOSWALD-BECK, supra note 100, at 585. In Blaškić, the Appeals Chamber 
focused on whether certain conduct “causes serious mental or physical suffering or injury or constitutes a 
serious attack on human dignity.” Prosecutor v. Blaškić, Case No. IT-95-14-A, Appeals Chamber 
Judgment, ¶ 595 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia July 29, 2004). In the Jokić sentencing 
judgment, the Trial Chamber “focus[ed] on the seriousness of the crimes to which Miodrag Jokić has 
pleaded guilty, in light of the specific circumstances of their commission.” Prosecutor v. Miodrag Jokić, 
Case No. IT-01-42/1-S, Trial Chamber Sentencing Judgment, ¶ 32 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former 
Yugoslavia Mar. 18, 2004). In Kordić & Čerkez, the Trial Chamber required a showing of serious injury, 
holding that a war crime is “distinguished from . . . inhuman treatment in that it requires a showing of 
serious mental or physical injury.” Prosecutor v. Kordić & Čerkez, Case No. IT-95-14/2-T, Trial Chamber 
Judgment, ¶ 245 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Feb. 26, 2001). For the crime of outrages 
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Taking a related approach, the Galić Trial Chamber explained that “this 
third condition [of Tadić], correctly interpreted, is not that the rule must be 
inherently ‘serious,’ which would mean that every violation of it would also be 
serious, but that the alleged violation of the rule—that is, of a recognized 
humanitarian rule—must be serious for the violation to come within the 
jurisdiction of the Tribunal.”198 In applying severity to the case, the Trial 
Chamber “considered the large number of victims when assessing the gravity of 
the crime.”199 In addition to the scale and choice of victims, the Trial Chamber 
also focused on the “particular cruelty” of the crimes committed, in addition to 
whether or not the violations themselves were serious.200 On the specific crime 
of terror bombing at issue, the Chamber evaluated the seriousness of the 
consequences in order to deem it a war crime. The majority wrote it was properly 
criminalized “where the serious violations took the form of serious injury or 
death caused to civilians,”201 while leaving open the question whether the same 
conduct would be a war crime if the results were less grave. 
Other tribunals have also focused on seriousness as applied to the facts of 
the case. For example, in Naletilić & Martinović, the ICTY Trial Chamber used 
the criterion of seriousness to elevate a violation of IHL to the war crime of 
“willfully causing great suffering or serious injury to body or health.”202 It 
assessed seriousness based on the resultant impact on the victims, holding that 
the crime “usually uses as a criterion of seriousness the length of time the victim 
is incapacitated for work.”203 The Chamber took great pains to define seriousness 
in this context; though the “serious harm” need not be permanent and 
irreversible, “it must involve harm that goes beyond temporary unhappiness, 
embarrassment, or humiliation. It must be harm that results in a grave and long-
term disadvantage to a person’s ability to lead a normal and constructive life.”204 
In Kvocka et al., the Trial Chamber similarly held that a key element of the war 
crime of torture is “severity of the pain or suffering,” and that “[i]n assessing the 
seriousness of any mistreatment,” the Trial Chamber must first consider the 
objective severity of the harm inflicted in addition to subjective criteria.205 
 
upon personal dignity, the ICTY in Aleksovski emphasized that “[t]he form, severity and duration of the 
violence, the intensity and duration of the physical or mental suffering, shall serve as a basis for assessing 
whether crimes were committed.” Aleksovski Trial Chamber Judgment, supra note 154, ¶ 57. 
 198. Galić Trial Chamber Judgment, supra note 112, ¶ 107. 
 199. Galić Appeals Chamber Judgment, supra note 116, ¶ 446. 
 200. Id. ¶ 447. 
 201. Cryer, supra note 145, at 93 (quoting Prosecutor v. Galić, Case No. IT-98-29-T, Trial 
Chamber Judgment, ¶ 127 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Dec. 5, 2003)). 
 202. Prosecutor v. Naletilić & Martinović, Case No. IT-98-34-T, Trial Chamber Judgment, 
¶¶ 339-43 (Int’l Crim. Trib. For the Former Yugoslavia Mar. 31, 2003) [hereinafter Naletilić & Martinović 
Trial Chamber Judgment], http://www.icty.org/x/cases/naletilic_martinovic/tjug/en/nal-tj030331-e.pdf. 
 203. Id.; see also Aleksovski Trial Chamber Judgment, supra note 154, ¶¶ 56-57 (considering 
the impact to the victim’s dignity and the resulting suffering). 
 204. Prosecutor v. Naletilić & Martinović, Case No. IT-98-34-T, Trial Chamber Judgment, ¶ 342 
(Int’l Crim. Trib. For the Former Yugoslavia Mar. 31, 2003) (quoting Prosecutor v. Krstic, Case No. IT-
98-33-T, Trial Chamber Judgment, ¶ 513 (Int’l Crim. Trib. For the Former Yugoslavia Aug. 2, 2001), 
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/krstic/tjug/en/krs-tj010802e.pdf). 
 205. Prosecutor v. Kvocka, Case No. IT-98-30/1-T, Trial Chamber Judgment, ¶¶ 142-43 (Int’l 
Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Nov. 2, 2001). 
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In some cases, tribunals discuss severity both in terms of “severe IHL 
breach” and as applied. In Tadić, the Appeals Chamber noted in one breath that 
seriousness is satisfied if there is a “breach of a rule protecting important values,” 
and in the next added that the breach “must involve grave consequences for the 
victim.”206 As suggested by the possibility that severity is introduced at multiple 
places in the analysis, the severity inquiry is overall subjective.207 Looking across 
the extant case law, scholars have lamented that there exists no clear test for 
determining which crimes are properly considered serious.208 Indeed, when 
severity is discussed, many different words have been employed to connote the 
same concept, including “seriousness,” “severity,” “brutality,” “inhumanity,” 
“gravity,” and “suffering.”209 
The severity element is generally considered essential to a war crime. In all 
the cases discussed above, severity was central to the court’s determination that 
the breach of IHL was criminal in nature. As Meron put it, “the gravity of the 
act, and the interests of the international community . . . [among other] factors 
are all relevant for determining the criminality of various acts.”210 
In fact, severity is so central to defining a war crime that it has sometimes 
been treated by tribunals as a stand-in for “criminalization.” If the violation is 
severe enough, the reasoning goes, it is not essential for the violation to have 
been previously criminalized. In the aforementioned Hinga Norman case, for 
instance, the SCSL’s landmark conviction for recruitment and use of child 
soldiers,211 the Appeals Chamber reasoned that because international law 
violations of similar severity were criminal, the breach of the prohibition of child 
recruitment must also itself be criminal.212 In so reasoning, according to Matthew 
Happold, “the Appeals Chamber seems to have elided the third and fourth criteria 
in Tadić.”213 Similarly, in Prosecutor v. Galić, the ICTY Trial Chamber reasoned 
that the question of whether a separate rule exists providing for criminalization 
“can be answered in the affirmative where the serious violations took the form 
of serious injury or death caused to civilians.”214 As Cryer has suggested, the 
Chamber thereby relied upon the uncontroversial position regarding the severity 
 
 206. Tadić Interlocutory Appeals Decision, supra note 102, ¶ 94. 
 207. See, e.g., AMBOS, supra note 86 at 166 (“Of course, the determination of the seriousness 
threshold is not an easy task.”); WERLE & JESSBERGER, supra note 2, at 404-405 (“It is not always easy 
to determine when this threshold for criminal sanction is reached.”). 
 208. See, e.g., Abi-Saab, supra note 69, at 112. 
 209. For example, in defining war crimes, the Belgian Law of War Manual highlights various 
such manifestations of the notion of severity and seriousness: simultaneously “[i]t would be preferable to 
restrict the term ‘war crime’ to violations that cause outrage to the public conscience owing to their 
‘brutality’, their ‘inhuman character.’” ECOLE ROYALE MILITAIRE (BELG.), DROIT PENAL ET 
DISCIPLINAIRE MILITAIRE ET DROIT DE LA GUERRE [CRIMINAL LAW AND MILITARY DISCIPLINE AND 
LAW OF WAR], DEUXIEME PARTIE, DROIT DE LA GUERRE [SECOND PART, LAW OF WAR], 
D/1983/1187/029, 55 (1983) (cited in Belgium: Practice Relating to Rule 156. Definition of War Crimes, 
IHL DATABASE: CUSTOMARY IHL, INT’L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, https://ihl-databases.icrc.org
/customary-ihl/eng/docs/v2_cou_be_rule156) (emphasis added). 
 210. Meron, Is International Law Moving, supra note 85, at 24. 
 211. Happold, supra note 145, at 291-92. 
 212. Id. 
 213. Id. 
 214. Galić Trial Chamber Judgment, supra note 116, ¶ 127. See Cryer, supra note 145, at 102. 
2019] What is a War Crime? 91 
of injuring civilians in order to satisfy, problematically, the fourth Tadić 
criterion.215 
Yet when international criminal tribunals treat the seriousness of a 
particular IHL breach as a substitute for criminalization, it has the effect of 
eliminating any limits on non-retroactivity—which, under the standard approach 
to war crimes prosecution, is satisfied by looking to prior “criminalization.”216 
That is a very dangerous course. Indeed, as already noted, a key critique of the 
Nuremberg decision is that it focused on the barbarity of the defendants’ acts and 
ignored legitimate concerns about prior notice.217 More recently, in his 
dissenting opinion in the Hinga Norman case, Judge Geoffrey Robertson 
persuasively identified in the majority’s approach a problematic tendency to 
conflate severity and criminality. Robertson rightly viewed this conflation as 
contrary to the very precepts underlying nullum crimen lege. He wrote: 
It must be acknowledged that like most absolute principles, nullum crimen can be 
highly inconvenient - especially in relation to conduct which is abhorrent or 
grotesque, but which parliament has not thought to legislate against. Every law 
student can point to cases where judges have been tempted to circumvent the nullum 
crimen principle to criminalise conduct which they regard as seriously antisocial or 
immoral, but which had not been outlawed by legislation or by established categories 
of common-law crimes. This temptation must be firmly resisted by international law 
judges . . . .218 
We agree. While severity is a necessary component of a war crime, it does 
not itself constitute a sufficient or appropriate response to concerns about 
retroactive punishment and therefore about the legality of the criminal 
punishment. Instead, as the next section will show, this is one reason that the 
retroactivity concern should be approached as a separate and independent check 
on criminal prosecution for a war crime. 
 
 215. See Cryer, supra note 145, at 93 (“The argument was: it is clear that attacks on civilians 
causing death or serious injury were criminal; and the Conference adopting Additional Protocol I also 
made clear their condemnation of acts intended to inflict terror. The violation at issue in Galić included 
both. This argument does not prove that there is a separate criminalised violation of the Additional 
Protocol, of violence the primary purpose of which is to inflict terror, instead of a particularly serious 
breach of Article 52(1)’s prohibition of attacking the civilian population, which would justify a 
particularly high sentence.” (citation omitted)). 
 216. GROVER, supra note 95, at 175-83. The aforementioned Galić and Hinga Norman cases 
reflect this tendency. An even more explicit example of modern international criminal tribunals’ appealing 
to the immorality of the conduct in order to justify the lack of notice to the defendant is the reasoning of 
the ICTY Trial Chamber in Prosecutor v. Milutinović & Others: “Although the immorality or appalling 
character of an act is not a sufficient factor to warrant its criminalization under customary international 
law, it may in fact play a role in that respect, insofar as it may refute any claim by the Defence that it did 
not know of the criminal nature of the acts.” Prosecutor v. Milutinović & Others, Case No. ICTY-99–37-
AR72, Decision on Dragoljub Ojdani’s Motion Challenging Jurisdiction – Joint Criminal Enterprise, ¶ 42 
(May 21, 2003). 
 217. See, e.g., HATHAWAY & SHAPIRO, supra note 48, at 290-93; Van Schaak, supra note 122, at 
101. 
 218. Dissenting Opinion of Justice Robertson, Prosecutor v. Samuel Hinga Norman, Case No. 
SCSL-2004-14-AR729E, Appeals Chamber Decision on Preliminary Motion Based on Lack of 
Jurisdiction (Child Recruitment), ¶ 12 (Special Ct. for Sierra Leone May 31, 2004) (emphasis added). 
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C. Non-Retroactivity without Criminalization 
As noted earlier, prior criminalization is largely motivated by a desire to 
address concerns about retroactivity—what some have referred to as the 
“legality” condition. Yet because it is inconsistently applied, and the sources to 
which courts appeal so varied, it fails to truly serve this function. The concern 
nonetheless remains: it is generally understood that it is only permissible to hold 
individuals criminally responsible for conduct that was criminal at the time the 
act was committed. An ex post facto law, one that changes the legal 
consequences of actions that were committed before the change in the law, 
violates basic principles of legal legitimacy. If we dispense with the prior 
“criminalization” requirement, does that mean dispensing with this condition as 
well? 
The concern about retroactivity has been a challenge since the inception of 
modern international criminal law. In the preparations for the Nuremberg trials, 
the prosecution was deeply concerned with precisely this difficulty. One solution 
was developed by a Czech lawyer, Bohuslav Ečer. All those involved agreed that 
the Axis powers had violated the prohibition on the waging of aggressive war in 
the Kellogg-Briand Pact, which each of the States had signed. But the difficulty 
the prosecution faced was figuring out how to translate that violation of law into 
individual criminal responsibility. Ečer’s solution, which he put in a memo to 
the London Assembly in 1942, was that the trial would not be holding the Nazis 
responsible for a new criminal act, but simply removing the immunity that they 
would otherwise enjoy.219 As he put it a year later, “[a]s soon as international 
law, as law of a higher order, deprived aggressive warfare of its legality, it was 
seen in its original, true likeness: a chain of forbidden crimes punishable by the 
heaviest penalties in the criminal law of the countries affected.”220 They were 
guilty, in other words, of “mass murder, arson, robbery, etc.” and they could 
therefore be sent “to the only place where the national court sends those guilty 
of murder, namely to the scaffold.”221 
Ečer’s solution, while clever, was, for a variety of reasons, not adopted by 
the IMT.222 Nor does it likely solve the dilemma facing modern courts. It 
attempts to solve the non-retroactivity problem by lifting a shield, leaving the 
defendant to be prosecuted for the ordinary domestic crimes that an actor in war 
engages in without protection from the cloak of combatant immunity. True, that 
 
 219. Confidential memorandum by Bohuslav Ečer entitled “Punishment of War Criminals” (Oct. 
10, 1942), in REPORTS OF COMMISSION I (FORMERLY COMMISSION III) ON THE TRIAL AND PUNISHMENT 
OF WAR CRIMINALS 56 (London International Assembly 1943). This discussion of Ečer draws from 
HATHAWAY & SHAPIRO, supra note 48, at 252-54. 
 220. Memorandum by Bohuslav Ečer entitled “The Crime of Aggressive War” (Nov. 1943), in 
REPORTS OF COMMISSION I (FORMERLY COMMISSION III) ON THE TRIAL AND PUNISHMENT OF WAR 
CRIMINALS, supra note 219, at 172(a), 172(f). 
 221. Id. at 172(f). Though Ečer did not expressly reference it, this approach resonated with 
Oppenheim’s 1906 definition of war crimes, which treated hostilities committed by individuals not 
members of enemy armed forces as criminally punishable because the individuals did not enjoy privileged 
treatment of members of armed forces. Such acts were, Oppenheim had made clear, “war crimes, not 
because they really are violations of recognized rules regarding warfare, but because the enemy has the 
right to consider and punish them as acts of illegitimate warfare.” OPPENHEIM, supra note 41, ¶ 254. 
 222. For more on why, see HATHAWAY & SHAPIRO, supra note 48, at 257-75. 
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domestic jurisdiction remains—in domestic courts. But international courts, or 
domestic courts with jurisdiction to prosecute or provide compensation for 
violations of international law, not for ordinary domestic crimes, would be 
deprived of jurisdiction over all such war criminals if this approach were correct. 
After all, any court with jurisdiction over only international law violations would 
not have jurisdiction over domestic law violations. 
Hans Kelsen, a leading legal thinker who was also involved in preparations 
for Nuremberg, offered his own solution to the retroactivity problem: the Axis 
leaders were collectively responsible because Germany had waged an illegal 
war, rendering all Germans liable for that violation under international law. 
Germany’s victims were entitled to wage war in response to the illegal war 
waged by Germany. In other words, all Germans could already be understood as 
collectively responsible and even subject to the penalty of death. Hence the 
Allies could subject German leaders to the lesser sanction of criminal 
prosecution, and even execution, instead of waging all-out war. Indeed, doing so 
was morally preferable, because it would limit punishment to those who had been 
in a position to prevent the illegal action. The problem of individual 
responsibility, Kelsen advised, could be addressed by adding language to the 
tribunal’s Charter that any person who violates “international law forbidding the 
use of force . . . may be held individually responsible for these acts . . . and 
brought to trial and punishment before the court.”223 Yes, this would create new 
law, but it would not subject defendants to any penalties to which they could not 
already be subject. The Allies could drop a bomb on Germany as a result of its 
violation of the law, so its leaders could be hanged instead. 
The tribunal did not adopt either Ečer’s or Kelsen’s solution. Instead, in an 
approach that has long been criticized—and rightly so—it concluded that it was 
enough that the war waged by the Germans was an illegal war. It was not 
necessary to find that waging an illegal war was criminal, the tribunal held, 
because “in such circumstances the attacker must know that he is doing wrong, 
and so far from it being unjust to punish him, it would be unjust if his wrong 
were allowed to go unpunished.”224 Far from addressing the retroactivity 
problem, the tribunal simply flung it aside. It is perhaps no surprise that modern 
international criminal law has subsequently found itself flummoxed by this same 
challenge. 
Part of the problem with the retroactivity issue in modern international 
criminal law is that it has been treated as if it is a single problem, when, in fact, 
it is several distinct problems. Today, there are several types of criminal 
prosecutions for war crimes: (1) ad hoc tribunals (the ICTY and the ICTR, and 
the residual Mechanism for International Criminal Tribunals); (2) domestic war 
crimes prosecutions under domestic statutes (including domestic military 
commissions); (3) hybrid domestic-international courts (including the 
Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia, the Special Tribunal for 
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Lebanon, and the SCSL); and (4) the International Criminal Court. The 
retroactivity problem is different—and the solution different—for each. 
Before explaining how the non-retroactivity condition is met in each of 
these contexts, it is worth addressing a possible objection: Isn’t this just as 
fragmented as the criminalization approach criticized above? The key difference 
here is that the solution to the retroactivity problem is not incorporated into the 
definition of a war crime. It is, instead, addressed as an independent check on the 
appropriateness of criminal liability. Rather than changing the range of conduct 
that might constitute a “war crime,” the definition of a “war crime” remains 
constant—it is a violation of IHL that is serious. But the legality condition 
constrains prosecution of a war crime in a jurisdiction where the conduct was not 
sanctionable at the time it took place. 
Let’s consider each context briefly in turn. First, the ad hoc tribunals were 
created by the U.N. Security Council acting under its Chapter VII authority. 
Here, a Kelsenian solution is available to justify the establishment of the ad hoc 
tribunals: the U.N. Security Council had the legal authority to authorize the use 
of force against the aggressors in the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda. Had it 
done so, States could have used force to prevent the violence in those States—
even killing the aggressors, if necessary. Just as the States that established the 
IMT established individual criminal responsibility where there was already 
collective legal responsibility, so too here could the Security Council establish 
individual criminal responsibility where there was already collective legal 
responsibility. Indeed, the ICTY and ICTR statutes were expressly established 
by the Security Council acting under Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter.225 Under 
the Kelsenian approach, because the defendants could have been held 
collectively responsible for participating in an armed conflict to which the 
Security Council could have responded, they were sufficiently on notice that 
their actions could subject them to legal penalty. 
Second, domestic war crimes prosecutions under domestic statutes can be 
justified in the way that domestic criminal law jurisdiction is generally justified. 
As long as the statute under which the defendant is prosecuted is forward-
looking, then the defendant who fell within the scope of the statute has no 
legitimate claim of impermissible retroactivity. As with any ordinary domestic 
crime, it is not necessary to establish that the defendant actually knew that he or 
she could be prosecuted. It is enough that the domestic law subjecting the 
behavior to criminal sanction was on the books at the time the crime was 
committed. Domestic courts may not only prosecute actors for war crimes, but 
also for ordinary domestic criminal offenses, as long as they are not members of 
the armed forces of a high contracting party of the Geneva Conventions. Hence, 
unprivileged combatants may be subject to prosecution for such acts as rape, 
murder, assault, and kidnapping committed in the course of war. Once again, as 
long as the law preceded the action, the defendant cannot make any legitimate 
claim of retroactivity. 
Third, hybrid courts, which include a mix of domestic and international 
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authorities, vary depending on the way in which they are constituted. The SCSL, 
for example, was set up by the government of Sierra Leone and the United 
Nations jointly to “prosecute persons who bear the greatest responsibility for 
serious violations of international humanitarian law and Sierra Leonean law” 
committed in Sierra Leone after November 30, 1996 and during the Sierra Leone 
Civil War.226 It was established both under the authority of the U.N. Security 
Council, acting under Chapter VII (as with the ad hoc tribunals), and by the 
Sierra Leone government. Accordingly, it has the authority to prosecute both 
serious violations of IHL and Sierra Leonean law that predated the establishment 
of the court.227 
Fourth, the International Criminal Court, established by treaty among the 
States, exercises prospective jurisdiction over States that have accepted its 
authority. Article 11 of the Rome Statute makes this explicit: “The Court has 
jurisdiction only with respect to crimes committed after the entry into force of 
this Statute.”228 Moreover, if a State becomes party to the statute after its entry 
into force, the Court may exercise its jurisdiction only with respect to crimes 
committed after the entry into force of the statute for that State.229 The Court may 
also exercise jurisdiction over a crime that would otherwise fall outside its 
jurisdiction if the matter is referred to the Prosecutor by the Security Council 
acting under Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter.230 Such referrals are subject to the 
same analysis as the ad hoc tribunals: to the extent that the Security Council 
could have authorized a use of force to respond to the violation, the criminal 
jurisdiction is justified as an exercise of that already existing authority to 
penalize illegal behavior. 
This brief treatment of each category of international criminal jurisdiction 
illustrates that retroactivity is best addressed in context. Rather than treating prior 
“criminalization” as essential to the definition of a war crime, non-retroactivity 
should be considered as a distinct issue to be addressed in each given situation. 
As long as the defendant was subject to sanction for the illegal act prior to the 
commission of the act, the principle of legality is satisfied. 
It is important to note that, under this approach, an act that meets the 
definition of a war crime—that is, that violates IHL and is serious—could not be 
criminally prosecuted if the act was not subject to criminal liability at the time it 
was committed. In that case, prosecution would be impermissibly retroactive. In 
other words, there can be war crimes that cannot be prosecuted. But this is no 
different from any situation in which previously non-criminal acts become 
criminal. Before 1994, for example, there was no crime of “material support for 
terrorism” in the United States. The Violent Crime Control Act of 1994 
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established it as a new crime.231 But because of the principle of legality, which 
prohibits retroactive punishment of behavior not criminal at the time it was 
committed, those who had provided “material support” for terrorists before the 
passage of the new statute could not be prosecuted for committing that new 
crime. That prohibition on criminal prosecution for behavior not criminal at the 
time it occurs—whether in the domestic or international context—is necessary 
to preserve justice. 
IV.   THE BENEFITS OF DEFINING WAR CRIMES 
The alternative approach to defining war crimes outlined in Part III is not 
subject to the infirmities of the prevailing prior “criminalization approach.” As 
noted in Part II, the criminalization approach is subject in particular to 
circularity, fragmentation, and retroactivity concerns. The approach to defining 
war crimes in Part III addresses circularity by decoupling the definition of war 
crimes from prior statutes and prosecutions; it addresses fragmentation by 
providing a uniform standard for assessing war crimes; and it addresses 
retroactivity by tackling it directly, as a concern distinct from the definition of a 
“war crime.” 
There are a number of practical doctrinal implications that follow. First, a 
uniform, trans-jurisdictional definition for war crimes provides a clearer standard 
for domestic courts holding individuals accountable for war crimes. It also helps 
resolve questions about the appropriate scope of civil liability for war crimes 
under domestic foreign affairs statutes, including the ATS and the U.S. Foreign 
Sovereign Immunity Act (FSIA). Second, it clarifies the reach of international 
legal obligations requiring States to investigate violations of the law of war. 
Third, it provides clearer guidance for determining whether charges lodged in 
military commissions are in accordance with the “law of nations,” as required by 
Article I of the U.S. Constitution. And fourth, it helps to clarify the extent to 
which combatants can be subject to war crimes prosecutions. 
A. Guiding Domestic Courts 
As important as international criminal courts and tribunals are for the 
development of international criminal law, ultimately war crimes prosecutions 
before international fora comprise just a narrow slice of all present-day war 
crimes prosecutions.232 Under Article 1 of the Rome Statute, prosecutions before 
the International Criminal Court are intended to be “complementary to [those of] 
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national criminal jurisdictions.”233 The Preamble to the Rome Statute also recalls 
“the duty of every State to exercise its criminal jurisdiction over those 
responsible for international crimes.”234 The Geneva Conventions state the 
principle of complementarity as an obligation of States to search for persons 
alleged to have committed, or ordered to have committed, grave breaches of the 
law of war, and to try or extradite them.235 A number of treaties similarly require 
States to investigate and prosecute war crimes committed in IAC and NIAC.236 
The U.N. Security Council, U.N. General Assembly, and U.N. Commission on 
Human Rights have all affirmed such obligations,237 while the ICRC considers 
the obligation to prosecute war crimes to be a rule of customary international 
law.238 As a result, the majority of war crimes prosecutions take place in 
domestic courts. Moreover, in exercising civil jurisdiction over war crimes, 
domestic courts—including U.S. federal courts—are called to reference and 
interpret the basic elements of war crimes. 
A trans-jurisdictional understanding of war crimes guides application by 
domestic courts of international law and supplies the conditions under which the 
international community and international courts and tribunals can rely on 
domestic courts for prosecutions of international war crimes.239 
1. European Domestic War Crimes Prosecutions 
A clear definition of international war crimes is important to domestic 
prosecutions on multiple levels. On a formal level, a minimum standard helps 
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answer the threshold question of whether domestic criminal jurisdiction over the 
offense in question is appropriate as a matter of international law. Under 
international law, States can exercise jurisdiction in criminal proceedings 
concerning activities outside of their territory when either of the two following 
conditions are met: (1) the perpetrator is a national of the State in which the legal 
proceedings are initiated or (2) the victim is a national of the State in which the 
legal proceedings are initiated.240 Absent these conditions, jurisdiction may only 
be found when the violations at issue constitute crimes of such international 
abhorrence to justify an invocation of universal jurisdiction—such as in the event 
of war crimes.241 
Contemporary examples of domestic war crimes prosecutions can be found 
in prosecutorial efforts currently under way in many European States to 
prosecute perpetrators of war crimes in Syria. These prosecutions are often 
pursued by specialized prosecutorial authorities or war crimes units. However, 
the crimes being charged are defined as international crimes, even though they 
are incorporated into domestic statutes or penal codes. To date, there have been 
at least three successful convictions in Sweden and three in Germany, with more 
trials underway.242 There are a small number of trials, and some other 
convictions, in other countries as well.243 
A number of States in Europe explicitly tether parts of their domestic 
criminal codes concerning war crimes to international law.244 While some States 
include only the crimes outlined in Article 8 of the Rome Statute, the domestic 
statutes of many States include a much broader set of crimes as prosecutable 
“war crimes.” Through implementing legislation that diverges from the Rome 
Statute, these national legislatures provide their judiciaries with the ability and 
leeway to define and apply the crime through such means as an assessment of 
the evolution of customary international law. The criminal code of Finland, for 
example, not only contains an explicit reference to the Rome Statute, but it also 
states that war crimes may include “provisions of [another] international 
agreement on war, armed conflict or occupation that is binding on Finland or the 
generally recognized and established laws and customs of war in accordance 
with international law.”245 The sweeping reference to IHL is intended to leave to 
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Finnish courts room to allow war crimes prosecutions that would fall outside the 
Rome Statute’s jurisdiction.246 In Bulgaria, the requirement in the Rome 
Statute’s Article 8 that the war crimes be part of “a plan or policy” or “large-
scale commission” is omitted entirely from the domestic war crimes 
legislation.247 
Perhaps of greatest practical significance, many domestic statutes go 
beyond Article 8 by not limiting the corpus of war crimes based on conflict 
classification. In Germany, for instance, the “Code of Crimes against 
International Law” (CCIL) also goes beyond Article 8 by including offenses 
applicable only to IAC under the Rome Statute.248 Other European domestic 
penal codes and statutes employ explicit language to include as war crimes NIAC 
violations while some other countries likewise diverge from international 
statutes by articulating a set of war crimes without clearly distinguishing between 
IACs and NIACs. The removal of the IAC-NIAC distinction reflects the 
domestic jurisdiction’s view that this approach better reflects customary 
international law.249  
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A trans-jurisdictional approach to war crimes helps delineate which IHL 
violations may serve as the basis for domestic prosecution in instances where the 
domestic codes refer to “war crimes.” Domestic courts, which are often 
unfamiliar with international law, may seek to simplify the project of identifying 
what a war crime is by looking to a definition offered in a particular jurisdictional 
statute—the Rome Statute, for example—to guide the determination of what 
constitutes a war crime. But the Rome Statute provides jurisdiction over a limited 
subset of war crimes. Hence an approach that treats the Statute as if it were a 
complete and accurate compilation of war crimes unnecessarily constrains 
domestic war crime prosecution. 
As Dapo Akande has pointed out, drafters of the Rome Statute, in an effort 
to avoid being over-inclusive of all customary international law crimes,250 
specifically omitted from Article 8 crimes that might qualify as war crimes under 
general international law. A substantive standard helps show that some of the 
conduct not included in Article 8 still may be properly prosecuted as “war 
crimes.” One notable example of a war crime for which there is no jurisdictional 
authority under the Rome Statute is the crime of infliction of terror on a civilian 
population. In the Galić case, the ICTY held in clear terms that terror constituted 
a war crime under international law. But this crime was deliberately (and 
controversially) omitted from the Rome Statute.251 
The crime of infliction of terror on a civilian population is not an isolated 
case. There are a number of customary IHL prohibitions that are not included in 
the Rome Statute that might give rise to a war crime.252 Beth Van Schaack has 
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explained that many of the IHL prohibitions most frequently violated in the 
Syrian conflict are precisely those over which the Rome Statute does not assert 
ICC jurisdiction.253 Since 2012, Syrian and ISIL forces have subjected civilians 
to many forms of indiscriminate and disproportionate attacks. The Rome Statute, 
however, contains no provision criminalizing indiscriminate attacks, regardless 
of whether the conflict is an IAC or NIAC. Moreover, the crime of 
disproportionate attacks can be prosecuted only when committed within an IAC 
under the Rome Statute.254 As a result of these omissions, for NIACs like Syria, 
the ICC Prosecutor can only bring charges for intentional attacks on civilians and 
civilian objects, a crime that might be more difficult to prove than 
disproportionate attacks (because intentionality implies that evidence of direct 
targeting is required). According to Van Schaack, “[t]hese gaps . . . have 
implications for the Court’s ability to prosecute a range of crimes being 
committed in Syria, including those involving unconventional, improvised, and 
prohibited weapons and weapon systems in the absence of sufficient evidence 
establishing that civilians were directly targeted.”255 For these crimes and others, 
European domestic courts might provide the only forum for redress. 
The Rome Statute is best understood as providing jurisdiction in the ICC 
over a subset of possible war crimes—not as defining the complete set of 
possible war crimes. Seen this way, Article 8 is not a constraint on prosecution 
in domestic court. Instead, it simply defines the scope of war crimes for which 
the ICC might exercise jurisdiction, and those which, by contrast, the court 
leaves to domestic courts. Viewing war crimes as separate from their particular 
jurisdictional context avoids importing jurisdictional decisions made for 
particular political or legal purposes into domestic law. 
In July 2016, for example, the Higher Regional Court of Frankfurt 
convicted a German national under the German Code of Crimes against 
International Law for atrocities committed in Syria.256 Likewise, in the case 
against Mouhannad Droubi—the first Swedish conviction for a Syrian war 
crime—the defendant, who fought for the Free Syrian Army and then emigrated 
to Sweden, was charged with torture as an international war crime for his assault 
and battery of a soldier while he was in Syria.257 The court found he had 
committed crimes against international law, which are defined by chapter 22, 
section 6 of the Swedish Penal Code as “serious violation of a treaty or agreement 
. . . or an infraction of a generally recognized principle or tenet relating to 
international humanitarian law.”258 
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Allowing Syrian war crimes to be prosecuted as international war crimes 
may be important for victims. In some instances, European prosecutors have 
resorted to domestic terrorism law to try Syrian perpetrators, because the 
evidentiary hurdles under domestic terrorism law can be less significant than for 
war crimes.259 However, many victims hope to see that crimes committed by the 
perpetrators are acknowledged as war crimes and/or crimes against humanity—
that is, as crimes of an international nature.260 As Human Rights Watch has 
noted, “terrorism charges often do not reflect the scope and nature of abuses 
committed, and risk undermining efforts to promote compliance with 
international humanitarian law.”261 
Meron usefully observed that “[t]he fact that international rules are 
normally enforced by national institutions and national courts applying 
municipal law does not in any way diminish the status of the violations as 
international crimes.”262 Indeed, the defining characteristic of the grave breaches 
regime was that the “grave breaches” were crimes of such concern that state 
parties to the Convention would prosecute them in both domestic and 
international fora.263 The approach offered here allows the two forms of 
prosecution to proceed in parallel, without constraining the domestic forum to 
the limits established for an international court’s jurisdiction. 
2. U.S. Alien Tort Statute 
In addition to penal jurisdiction, domestic courts may also exercise civil 
jurisdiction over war crimes. Many States allow individuals to append civil suits 
to criminal suits, permitting recovery of civil damages for any matter over which 
the court may exercise criminal jurisdiction. Some also exercise stand-alone civil 
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jurisdiction.264 Most notably, the ATS allows for a “civil action” filed by an 
“alien,” “for a tort only,” and looks to international law to determine whether the 
tort is “committed in violation of the law of nations.”265 War crimes are among 
the violations of the “law of nations” for which courts have held that the ATS 
provides jurisdiction.266 
Because the ATS applies only to acts in “violation of the law of nations,” 
a war crime must be a war crime under international law (not just under domestic 
law) in order to be subject to ATS liability. Yet there is significant uncertainty 
among U.S. courts about how best to identify an international “war crime.” U.S. 
courts have adopted a variety of methods over the years to establish whether a 
particular IHL offense constitutes a war crime, but the exact contours of ATS 
liability for war crimes remain elusive.267 Some courts simply point to the 
Geneva Conventions, influenced, perhaps, by the U.S. War Crimes Act, which 
defines war crimes by reference to the conventions.268 In Sarei v. Rio Tinto, for 
example, the Ninth Circuit stated: “War crimes are defined primarily by the 
Geneva Conventions, to which the United States, along with at least 180 nations, 
is a party and which constitute part of customary international law.”269 In In re 
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Xe Services Alien Tort Litigation,270 the Ninth Circuit likewise observed that 
“[b]y ratifying the Geneva Conventions, Congress has adopted a precise, 
universally accepted definition of war crimes.”271 However, the court then went 
on to adopt a more substantive, elements-based approach to defining a war crime 
for ATS purposes, explaining that to allege a war crime under the ATS the 
plaintiffs must “show that defendants (i) intentionally (ii) killed or inflicted 
serious bodily harm (iii) upon innocent civilians (iv) during an armed conflict 
and (v) in the context of and in association with that armed conflict.”272 In 
identifying these elements, the court looked not only to the Geneva Conventions 
but also various domestic and international sources—including an international 
tribunal case discussing how to interpret the offense’s nexus to armed conflict.273 
Still other courts have looked to the statutes of particular tribunals to try to 
identify the scope of war crimes, often confusing the scope of a particular statute 
with the proper definition of a “war crime” under international law as a general 
matter.274 
Moreover, in their recognition of war crimes,275 courts have sometimes 
failed to acknowledge that violations of IHL that are not war crimes could also 
provide the basis for ATS liability. After all, the statute refers not to “war crimes” 
but to violations of the “law of nations.”276 Accordingly, violations of IHL that 
do not rise to the level of a war crime (that are not, in other words, “serious”) 
could still provide the basis for ATS liability, because—though not “war 
crimes”—they constitute violations of the law of nations. 
The Supreme Court’s recent holding in Jesner v. Arab Bank also reflects 
persistent confusion created by overreliance on the jurisdiction of particular 
international tribunals in the ATS context.277 There, the plurality relied on the 
“mechanisms of enforce[ment]” in the charters of international criminal tribunals 
to locate liability for foreign corporations.278 However, in focusing on narrower 
“forms of liability” rather than “substantive” international law, the plurality fails 
to recognize how the law of nations actually operates.279 The plurality’s 
preoccupation with enforcement mechanisms mimics the criminalization 
approach for war crimes, which allows jurisdictional limitations to obscure the 
simpler—and more important—question of what, substantively speaking, 
constitutes a war crime. 
Understanding that the definition of a war crime is simply a violation of 
IHL that is serious makes it possible to clear away much of this confusion, thus 
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simplifying the courts’ inquiry and ensuring that the scope of liability is neither 
excessively broad nor unduly narrow. 
B. Law of War Violations and the Duty to Investigate Under IHL 
The trans-jurisdictional definition of war crimes also clarifies the reach of 
international law obligations requiring States to investigate violations of the law 
of war committed in armed conflict. The obligation to investigate violations of 
the law of war begins with the Geneva Conventions, which require States to 
“search for persons alleged to have committed, or to have ordered to be 
committed” grave breaches of the Convention,280 regardless of their nationality. 
For some commentators, this clause means that the obligation to investigate war 
conduct potentially violating international law is limited to the grave breaches 
specifically.281 
However, it is not clear that the obligation to investigate is limited in this 
way. The Geneva Conventions indicate that “[e]ach High Contracting Party shall 
take measures necessary for the suppression of all acts contrary to the provisions 
of the present Convention other than the grave breaches defined in the following 
Article.”282 Moreover, the 1977 Additional Protocol I requires state parties’ 
armed forces and other persons under their control “to prevent and, where 
necessary, to suppress and to report to competent authorities breaches of the 
Conventions and of this Protocol.”283 AP I, moreover, provides that those same 
parties shall require any commander who is aware of breaches “to initiate such 
steps as are necessary to prevent such violations of the Conventions or this 
Protocol, and, where appropriate, to initiate disciplinary or penal action against 
violators thereof.”284 States shall also “repress grave breaches, and take measures 
necessary to suppress all other breaches, of the Conventions or of this Protocol 
which result from a failure to act when under a duty to do so.”285 By their terms, 
these provisions would seem to extend the obligation to investigate beyond grave 
breaches of the Geneva Conventions, at least for parties to AP I.286 
The ICRC has interpreted the obligation to investigate as an obligation to 
investigate war crimes, not just grave breaches. According to the ICRC, States 
“must investigate war crimes allegedly committed by their nationals or armed 
forces, or on their territory, and, if appropriate, prosecute the suspects.”287 
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Furthermore, they are required to “investigate other war crimes over which they 
have jurisdiction and, if appropriate, prosecute the suspects.”288 The Rome 
Statute also frames the obligation as one pertaining to crimes.289 A plethora of 
United Nations General Assembly290 resolutions, as well as comments by the 
U.N. Human Rights Committee,291 have likewise recalled the obligation of States 
to investigate and punish perpetrators of “war crimes.” However, the ICRC notes 
that the General Assembly resolutions attracted substantial abstentions and some 
negative votes due to “insufficient clarity regarding the definition of war 
crimes.”292 
The duty to investigate flows alongside similar obligations to investigate 
imposed by human rights law and enforced by regional human rights courts in a 
number of contemporary conflicts.293 In human rights case law, it is often 
suggested that the obligation to investigate is triggered when an “arguable claim” 
or a “credible” assertion of a violation is presented to a State, or when a State 
otherwise becomes knowledgeable about the potential for an offense.294 In the 
Boskoski & Turcalovski case, the ICTY described the obligation to investigate 
as “an obligation to conduct an effective investigation with a view to establishing 
the facts.”295 
In the United States, the Department of Defense Directive Number 
2311.01E, similar to a number of other military manuals around the world, 
suggests that the U.S. military understands the obligation to investigate as 
broader than an obligation to investigate grave breaches. Section 3.2 of the 
Directive defines a “reportable incident” as: 
A possible, suspected, or alleged violation of the law of war, for which there is 
credible information, or conduct during military operations other than war that would 
constitute a violation of the law of war if it occurred during an armed conflict.296 
Further, the Directive observes that “[a]ll reportable incidents committed 
by or against U.S. personnel, enemy persons, or any other individual are reported 
promptly, investigated thoroughly, and, where appropriate, remedied by 
corrective action.”297 The Canadian Law of Armed Conflict Manual similarly 
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suggests that commanders are required to “suppress and to report to competent 
authorities, breaches of the LOAC.”298 Those violations that appear upon review 
to constitute potential war crimes are then considered for prosecution.299 
Whether the duty to investigate is taken to extend to all potential law of 
war offenses or all potential war crimes, this Article helps to explain how the 
obligation to investigate law of war offenses is broader than an obligation to 
investigate war crimes. Meanwhile, an obligation to investigate war crimes 
should be understood to be broader than an obligation to investigate grave 
breaches. In this way, the definition helps bring clarity to this notoriously 
uncertain area of IHL. 
C. Clarifying the Jurisdiction of Military Commissions 
In the context of the U.S. program of post-9/11 military commissions 
prosecutions, courts have considered whether commissions are limited to 
prosecuting international war crimes, consistent with Congress’s power under 
Article I, Section 8 of the U.S. Constitution to “define and punish . . . Offences 
against the Law of Nations.”300 Related to this is the more general question of 
whether Congress can simply decide that certain domestic offenses are “war 
crimes” for the purposes of U.S. law. The Military Commissions Act of 2009 
(MCA 2009) provides the U.S. military commissions with jurisdiction over any 
“alien unprivileged enemy belligerent” for any offense made punishable by the 
Military Commissions Act, namely, breaches of offenses listed in Articles 104 
and 106 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice, as well as offenses provided 
for in “the law of war.”301 
The boundary between international law and domestic law pertaining to 
war has caused significant confusion, in part because the Supreme Court has in 
the past referenced both sources of law when determining the scope of 
Congress’s “define and punish” power. For example, in the landmark post-Civil 
War case Ex Parte Quirin, the Court noted that the Supreme Court has 
historically “recognized and applied the law of war as including that part of the 
law of nations which prescribes, for the conduct of war, the status, rights and 
duties of enemy nations as well as of enemy individuals.”302 In Hamdan v. 
Rumsfeld in 2007, the plurality cited Quirin and described conspiracy as being 
“recognized as an offense against the law of war” both “in this country and 
internationally,” citing international tribunals and treaties to support this 
position.303 
An examination of prosecutions before military commissions reveals 
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significant deviations between the definition of war crimes advanced by the 
military commissions and the international definition of the term. These 
deviations not only call into question the substantive outcomes of these cases, 
but they indicate that these cases cannot be relied upon as examples of 
international war crimes. The following sections detail two areas of deviation: 
liability for inchoate crimes and interpretation of the IHL requirement’s nexus 
component. 
1. Inchoate Liability 
The seminal case addressing whether the military commissions can 
prosecute law of war offenses that are not international war crimes is the 2016 
case of Al Bahlul v. U.S. before the D.C. Circuit. When addressing whether 
conspiracy was a charge that could be brought before a military commission, the 
court considered whether military commissions charges must accord with 
international law. In opinions from various stages of the litigation, judges 
disagreed about which crimes fall into the category of international war crimes, 
regardless of whether they considered it a necessity that crimes charged in 
military commissions constitute international war crimes in the first place. For 
example, Judge Wilkins concluded that al Bahlul’s conviction complied with the 
U.S. Constitution because the charges against him had sufficient roots in 
international law. As he remarked, “[w]hen I look at what [al] Bahlul was really 
convicted of, I see a war crime.”304 However, several of his colleagues disagreed. 
Concurring and dissenting in part in a 2014 decision, Judge Rogers found that 
“the international law of war does not recognize inchoate conspiracy as a law-
of-war offense.”305 According to her, “[f]or more than seventy years, the 
Supreme Court has interpreted the ‘law of war’ to mean the international law of 
war.”306 She noted that “[m]odern statutes defining international law-of-war 
offenses do not refer to conspiracy to commit such offenses” and cited to the 
statutes of the ICTY, ICTR, and the SCSL.307 
The distillation of the core war crimes elements in Part III of this Article 
supports Judge Rogers’s view. At present, “conspiracy” does not amount to a 
war crime. IHL treaties do not include offenses for inchoate activity, including 
conspiracy.308 As Cassese has explained, “in [international criminal law] no 
customary rule has evolved on conspiracy on account of the lack of support from 
civil countries for this category of crime.”309 While the Nuremberg Charter 
provided for the punishment of those “participating in a common plan or 
conspiracy,” both the Nuremberg Tribunals and the U.S. Military Tribunals at 
Nuremberg elected to take a very restrictive view of conspiracy.310 Because 
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conspiracy does not violate IHL, it does not meet the first condition for an 
international war crime. 
As a result, the war crimes definition offered here provides the basis for a 
compelling defense that al Bahlul should not be convicted for conspiracy as an 
international war crime.311 To the extent Article 1, Section 8 of the U.S. 
Constitution, when read in light of Article III, requires that offenses created 
under Congress’s “define and punish” power constitute crimes within the “law 
of nations,” al Bahlul should not have been charged in a military commission 
setting but should instead have been brought before an Article III court on 
domestic law charges. 
2. Nexus to an Armed Conflict 
IHL is only triggered in cases where the conduct in question has a nexus to 
an armed conflict. Where there is no such nexus, the conduct cannot be said to 
violate IHL, because IHL does not apply. And, of course, if IHL does not apply, 
then a given action cannot constitute an international war crime. If U.S. military 
commissions can only try international law violations, then putative “war 
crimes” to which IHL does not apply cannot fall within its jurisdiction. 
The dangers posed by the possibility of using commissions to prosecute 
more than international law crimes was illustrated when President Donald Trump 
suggested that he would explore sending Sayfullo Saipov—the ISIS-inspired 
perpetrator of the October 31, 2017 truck attack in New York City—to the 
Guantánamo Bay detention center to face charges by military commission.312 
Trump’s position received the support of at least two prominent senators.313 
As commentator Marko Milanovic rightly pointed out, in addition to the 
likely constitutional limitations on such a prosecution, there is no way that such 
a prosecution could ever be for an international war crime. Saipov was, as 
Milanovic points out, “essentially self-radicalized by looking at ISIS materials 
on the Internet and . . . , beyond professing allegiance to ISIS, was at no point 
subject to the chain of command of that armed group fighting in Iraq and 
Syria.”314 If he was not affiliated with ISIS, then it would be difficult—if not 
impossible—to prove that he possessed sufficient nexus to an armed conflict to 
trigger IHL. As Milanovic puts it, “[u]nder IHL . . . there is not even a remotely 
plausible, let alone genuinely persuasive, argument that this individual has a 
nexus to any armed conflict/was a member of a non-state armed group engaging 
in hostilities in such a conflict . . . he is only a (vicious) criminal.”315 IHL, after 
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all, is triggered when an armed conflict “play[s] a substantial part in the 
perpetrator’s ability to commit” the offense at issue, including in the 
perpetrator’s “decision to commit it, the manner in which it was committed[,] or 
the purpose for which it was committed.”316 Here, Saipov claims to have never 
materially interacted with terrorist combatants, shared resources, or executed 
instructions. Perhaps advised by his lawyers that bringing Saipov to Guantánamo 
would have triggered a host of legal challenges, Trump ultimately backed down 
and allowed the prosecution to proceed in domestic court. There he pled guilty 
in order to avoid the death penalty.317 
A similar problem is raised by the case of Abd Al-Rahim Hussain 
Mohammed al Nashiri, the alleged orchestrator of the 2000 bombing of the 
U.S.S. Cole, the deadliest attack on an American vessel since 1987. On August 
20, 2016, the D.C. Circuit denied al Nashiri’s motion for a writ of mandamus to 
dissolve the military commission that tried him.318 The role of “nexus” in 
triggering IHL figured importantly in the D.C. Circuit’s decision given that under 
Article I of the U.S. Constitution, the military commission trying al Nashiri only 
retained jurisdiction over crimes with a “nexus to hostilities.”319 Al Nashiri 
challenged the commission’s jurisdiction on the basis that his acts lacked a link 
to ongoing hostilities, and that he therefore had a right to be heard in an Article 
III court. The charges against him, he argued, involved alleged plots that 
occurred before the United States was engaged in an armed conflict covered by 
the military commissions law. His alleged actions therefore did not have a 
specific and cognizable nexus to an ongoing armed conflict, which is necessary 
to trigger IHL.320 And if IHL did not apply, it would be improper to prosecute 
him for violating it by committing an international war crime. The government 
responded that the United States had, in fact, been in hostilities with al Qaeda 
since at least 1998, well before the U.S.S. Cole attack, and therefore IHL did 
apply to al Nashiri’s actions. 
The D.C. Circuit denied the writ of mandamus that al Nashiri sought, 
clearing the way for the military commission hearing against him to proceed. 
The court reaffirmed the decision below: the decision of whether al Nashiri’s 
conduct took place during hostilities governed by IHL should occur after any 
conviction, at which point he would be permitted to seek Article III review.321 
The questions raised by al Nashiri regarding the proper application of IHL 
therefore remain unresolved—and are likely to remain so for some time. When 
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and if he does finally obtain review in an Article III court, the question will again 
arise: Is his conduct properly considered an international war crime? To answer 
that question, the court will need to consider whether the conduct was a violation 
of IHL (which requires a nexus to an armed conflict) that was serious. 
D. “Unlawful Combatants” and War Crimes 
The war crimes definition offered here also helps to clarify the extent to 
which civilians can be subject to war crimes prosecutions. This challenge has 
come up in two distinct but interrelated contexts. First, U.S. military commission 
prosecutors have alleged that acts of war carried out by “unlawful enemy 
combatants” amount to war crimes by virtue of the status of the perpetrators. 
Second, some have argued that CIA drone operators carrying out targeted 
killings are similarly guilty of war crimes simply because they are civilians 
engaged in military activity. 
The case of Omar Khadr exemplifies the prosecution of “unlawful enemy 
combatants” before the U.S. military commissions. Khadr was charged with 
throwing a grenade at a tank during a firefight in Afghanistan in 2002.322 Killing 
an enemy combatant in the midst of ongoing battle is permissible under IHL. But 
military commission prosecutors argued that Khadr’s actions amounted to a war 
crime because Khadr committed the act as an “unlawful enemy combatant.”323 
Critics challenged the prosecution’s argument by pointing out that killing on the 
battlefield is only a violation of IHL if the victim has protected status or if 
prohibited methods of killing are used. Khadr’s defense argued that Khadr’s act 
was not a war crime, because the victim (an opposing combatant) was not a 
protected person, and the method of killing was permissible. 
The defense has the stronger case. IHL does not create a status of “unlawful 
enemy combatant.” IHL does provide immunity for the actions of lawful 
combatants. Article 82 of the Third Geneva Convention provides: 
A prisoner of war shall be subject to the laws, regulations and orders in force in the 
armed forces of the Detaining Power; the Detaining Power shall be justified in taking 
judicial or disciplinary measures in respect of any offence committed by a prisoner 
of war against such laws, regulations or orders. However, no proceedings or 
punishments contrary to the provisions of this Chapter shall be allowed. . . . If any 
law, regulation or order of the Detaining Power shall declare acts committed by a 
prisoner of war to be punishable, whereas the same acts would not be punishable if 
committed by a member of the forces of the Detaining Power, such acts shall entail 
disciplinary punishments only.324 
But merely because an action is not subject to immunity does not necessarily 
make it a war crime. It simply means that the actions are not immunized from 
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criminal prosecution for domestic offenses—like murder. Terms like “unlawful 
enemy combatant” or “unprivileged combatant” do not have relevance in 
international war crimes prosecutions and cannot be used as a basis for 
identifying a war crime as a matter of international law. Instead, Khadr is more 
appropriately charged with domestic law offense of murder or terrorism—
actions for which IHL provides no immunity. Notably, military commission 
prosecutors are loathe to admit to this infirmity because doing so would deprive 
them of jurisdiction over this and many other cases—for the commissions may 
only prosecute international law offenses, not domestic law offenses. 
Similar concerns arise in the debate over whether civilian drone operators 
who carry out targeted killings could be held liable for war crimes.325 
Commentators have in recent years asserted that CIA personnel who perform 
targeted drone killings should be considered “war crimes” perpetrators, because 
they are “unlawful combatants.”326 In a perhaps ironic turn, their contentions 
arguably draw support from the military commissions’ willingness to prosecute 
the “war crime” of “murder in violation of the law of war” on the basis that the 
perpetrator is an unlawful combatant.327 
Both arguments are in error. The claim that an actor is an “unlawful 
combatant” is insufficient, by itself, to justify a war crimes prosecution. For a 
civilian to have committed a “war crime,” his or her acts must have a sufficient 
nexus to an armed conflict to trigger the application of IHL.328 A civilian—
whether a member of the CIA targeting a drone strike or a member of al Qaeda—
may only be held responsible for a war crime if the act is a violation of IHL that 
is serious.329 
CONCLUSION 
This Article has sought to provide a definition of war crimes that can be 
adopted as a baseline by commentators, militaries, courts, and tribunals. The 
common approach of defining war crimes as those IHL offenses that have been 
“criminalized” leads to unnecessarily convoluted analysis. It also undercuts the 
growth and development of a body of international offenses identifiable as “war 
crimes.” This Article advocates for a simpler approach: a definition of war 
crimes as serious violations of IHL. These elements are properly viewed as 
substantive in nature and not tied to jurisdictional statutes, the outputs of 
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international tribunals, or other purported sources of “criminalization.” And 
rather than attempting to address concerns about retroactivity by relying on prior 
“criminalization,” this approach addresses the problem in context, asking in each 
case whether the defendant is properly criminally prosecuted for an act that was 
at the time the subject of criminal liability. 
Ultimately, the potential implications of a clear definition of war crimes 
span a host of contexts—international and domestic. A “minimum standard” of 
war crimes helps those advising combat forces to consider potential liability for 
international war crimes, especially since it serves as the baseline for 
international war crimes prosecution in either domestic or international court. A 
general category of war crimes also enables a clearer dialogue between 
international and domestic prosecutions of IHL offenses—clarity that is 
especially critical when crimes like those taking place in Syria are being pursued 
in a variety of fora. The minimum standard also assists in a critical analysis of 
whether domestic prosecutions are properly styled as prosecutions of 
international—as opposed to merely domestic—war crimes. Moreover, the 
definition has civil consequences: it illuminates the extent to which liability for 
war crimes is permissible under the ATS, as well as the extent to which 
prosecutions in the U.S. military commissions system adhere to international law 
standards. 
Violations of the laws of war unfortunately continue to be numerous and 
grave. As international institutions and states redress these wrongs, a simplified 
approach to an international war crimes definition will help ensure the coherence 
of a body of “war crimes” law amidst chaotic evolutions in warfare and 
continuing developments of the rules regulating conduct in war. 
